United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Eastern Division
DONNA NEIGHBORS, Administratrix of the Estate of Joshua Wade Smith, deceased PLAINTIFF
v.
SHELTER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY DEFENDANT
OPINION AND ORDER
KRISTINE G. BAKER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before
the Court is a motion for partial summary judgment filed by
defendant Shelter Mutual Insurance Company
(“Shelter”) (Dkt. No. 8). Plaintiff Donna
Neighbors, Administratrix of the Estate of Joshua Wade Smith,
deceased, responded in opposition (Dkt. No. 13). Shelter
replied (Dkt. No. 16). Also before the Court is a motion to
quash plaintiff's notice of Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of
Shelter Mutual Insurance Company filed by Shelter (Dkt. No.
22), to which Ms. Neighbors responded in opposition (Dkt. No.
24). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the motion
for partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 8). The Court holds
under advisement the motion to quash plaintiff's notice
of Rule 30(b)(6) deposition (Dkt. No. 22).
I.
Ripeness Of Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
As a
threshold matter, Ms. Neighbors argues that Shelter's
motion for partial summary judgment is premature (Dkt. No.
15, at 4). She asserts that no discovery has been conducted
in this matter and that only a limited amount of discovery
was conducted in her prior filing in Phillips County Case
54-CV-2017-96 (Id.). Ms. Neighbors contends that she
should have the opportunity to arm herself with whatever
facts discovery would yield prior to facing summary judgment
(Id.). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d),
if a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for
specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to
justify its opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the
court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2)
allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take
discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.
“As
a general rule, summary judgment is proper only after the
nonmovant has had adequate time for discovery.”
Hamilton v. Bangs, McCullen, Butler, Foye & Simmons,
L.L.P., 687 F.3d 1045, 1049 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotations omitted). “This option [under Rule 56(d)]
exists to prevent a party from being unfairly thrown out of
court by a premature motion for summary judgment.”
Id. at 1050. However, Rule 56 “does not
require trial courts to allow parties to conduct discovery
before entering summary judgment.” United States ex
rel. Small Bus. Admin. v. Light, 766 F.2d 394, 397 (8th
Cir.1985) (per curiam). Thus, district courts possess
“wide discretion in denying” Rule 56(d) motions.
Anzaldua v. Ne. Ambulance & Fire Prot. Dist.,
793 F.3d 822, 836 (8th Cir. 2015).
A Rule
56(d) affidavit “must set forth specific facts further
discovery might uncover, or what information further
discovery might reveal.” Hamilton, 687 F.3d at
1049 (affirming denial of Rule 56(d) motion where district
court stayed discovery and then ruled on motion for summary
judgment, determining plaintiff failed to show what further
facts he would uncover through a Rule 56(d) extension). A
nonmovant seeking relief under Rule 56(d) must do more than
speculate that it may discover additional facts that would
overcome a motion for summary judgment, see Stanback v.
Best Diversified Prods., 180 F.3d 903, 911 (8th
Cir.1999), and must submit an affidavit showing
“‘what specific facts further discovery might
unveil.'” Id. (quoting Dulany v.
Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir.1997)).
“Where a party fails to carry [his] burden under Rule
[56(d)], ‘postponement of a ruling on a motion for
summary judgment is unjustified.'” Id.
(quoting Humphreys v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc.,
990 F.2d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir.1993)).
Ms.
Neighbors failed to submit an affidavit or declaration
explaining what facts or information further discovery might
uncover and why she cannot present facts essential to justify
her opposition to Shelter's motion for partial summary
judgment at this time. Therefore, the Court rejects Ms.
Neighbors' argument that Shelter's motion for partial
summary judgment is premature (Dkt. No. 15, at 4).
II.
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
A.
Factual Background
Unless
otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from
Shelter's statement of undisputed material facts in
support of Shelter's motion for partial summary judgment
and from Ms. Neighbors' statement of disputed and
undisputed facts (Dkt. Nos. 10, 14). The Court notes that
Local Rule 56.1 of the Local Rules of the United States
District Court for the Eastern and Western Districts of
Arkansas provides that all material facts set forth in the
statement filed by the moving party shall be deemed admitted
unless controverted by the statement filed by the non-moving
party. Local Rule 56.1(c). As such, the Court deems admitted
each parties' statement of material facts to the extent
statements are not controverted by the opposing party.
1.
The Motor Vehicle Accident
The
motor vehicle accident that is the subject of this lawsuit
occurred on or about March 24, 2017, in Hazen, Prairie
County, Arkansas (Dkt. No. 14, ¶ 1). Shelter alleges
that Joshua Wade Smith, deceased, occupied the insured
vehicle solely as the driver (Dkt. No. 10, ¶ 1). Ms.
Neighbors asserts that Mr. Smith occupied the insured vehicle
as the driver prior to the first impact of the accident (Dkt.
No. 14, ¶ 1). The vehicle driven by Mr. Smith was owned
by the named insured, Gretchen Brannon Ferebee, and was
insured by Shelter (Id., ¶ 2). Mr. Smith was
not listed as an insured on the Declarations, nor was he
related to the named insured, Ms. Ferebee, at the time of the
accident (Id., ¶ 3). Ms. Neighbors alleges that
Mr. Smith did reside with the named insured on the night
prior to the accident (Id.). Ms. Neighbors asserts
that she has had insufficient time to discover the extent of
the residence other than that provided in Ms. Ferebee's
deposition given in a related matter involving the same
accident as at issue herein (Id.). The Court notes
that, in her deposition given in another matter, Ms. Ferebee
was asked whether she and Mr. Smith lived together at the
time of the accident or before and replied that they did not
(Dkt. No. 8-2, at 2). Further, Ms. Neighbors contends that
Mr. Smith had no insurance coverage other than that on Ms.
Ferebee's vehicle (Dkt. No. 14, ¶ 3).
Mr.
Smith and his passengers, Ms. Ferebee and non-party Courtney
Young, were traveling west on Interstate 40 when Mr. Smith
lost control of the vehicle and then crossed onto the
shoulder and struck the adjacent guardrail (Id.,
¶ 4). Ms. Neighbors alleges that Mr. Smith lost control
of the vehicle due to impact by another vehicle
(Id.). Shelter contends that the vehicle overturned
and, in the process of overturning, Mr. Smith and Ms. Ferebee
were ejected from the vehicle - Mr. Smith from the
driver's seat and Ms. Ferebee from the passenger seat
(Dkt. No. 10, ¶ 4). Shelter asserts that, after being
ejected, the vehicle then rolled over Mr. Smith, and Mr.
Smith was pronounced dead at the scene by the Prairie County
Coroner (Id.). Ms. Neighbors disputes the location
from where Shelter asserts Mr. Smith was ejected. Ms.
Neighbors contends that, “at the instance of his
ejectment, after striking the guard rail, it is impossible to
know [Mr. Smith's] exact location inside or even outside
the vehicle at this time” (Dkt. No. 14, ¶ 4).
However, Ms. Neighbors does not dispute that, at the instant
that Ms. Ferebee's vehicle was struck by the unknown
vehicle, Mr. Smith was occupying the driver's seat in Ms.
Ferebee's vehicle (Id.).
The
parties disagree about what the Prairie County Coroner's
certificate of death states about how Mr. Smith died.
According to Shelter, the chain of events listed on the death
certificate indicates that Mr. Smith's death occurred
prior to the vehicle rolling over him (Dkt. No. 10, ¶ 5)
(emphasis omitted). Citing the Prairie County Coroner Byrum
Kelly's affidavit, Ms. Neighbors disputes Shelter's
interpretation of the death certificate (Dkt. No. 14, ¶
5).
The
parties also disagree about a letter sent by counsel for Ms.
Neighbors to Shelter on April 21, 2017. Shelter asserts that,
on April 21, 2017, Ms. Neighbors submitted a demand on
Shelter for payment of “Med-pay/PIP Uninsured Motorist
and Accidental Death [sic] benefits” (Dkt. No. 10,
¶ 6) (edit in original). Shelter submits that absent
from the demand letter was any proof of any damages,
including medical or funeral expenses, incurred by Mr. Smith
(Id.). Ms. Neighbors disputes that she submitted a
“demand” letter for payment (Dkt. No. 14, ¶
6). Instead, she maintains that the April 21, 2017, letter
was merely a letter of representation with no
“demand” for payment; she readily admits that
said letter of representation contained no proof of medical
or funeral expenses (Id.). It is undisputed that Mr.
Smith did not incur medical expenses and that no such
expenses were submitted to Shelter (Id., ¶ 7).
Ms. Neighbors argues that Mr. Smith incurred funeral expenses
(Id.).
Shelter
maintains that it responded to Ms. Neighbors' demand on
May 2, 2017, denying Ms. Neighbors' claim for medical
payments or accidental death benefits as Mr. Smith did not
meet the definition of an “insured” under the
Policy (Dkt. No. 10, ¶ 8). According to Shelter, it
included with this correspondence its previous letter to Ms.
Neighbors from April 5, 2017, regarding its investigation
into and denial of the claim for the same reasons
(Id.). Ms. Neighbors does not dispute that Shelter
responded to her letter of representation on May 2, 2017,
denying Ms. Neighbors' claim and coverage therefore (Dkt.
No. 14, ¶ 8).
2.
The Policy
Ms.
Neighbors filed her complaint on May 12, 2017, alleging
entitlement to medical payments and funeral expense benefits,
accidental death benefits, and uninsured motorist benefits,
in addition to damages for Shelter's alleged bad faith
denial of payments of these benefits (Id., ¶
9). The Policy issued by Shelter and under which Ms.
Neighbors claims entitlement to the limits of the medical
payments and accidental death benefits contains the following
provisions:
INSURANCE
AGREEMENT FOR COVERAGE C
Subject to all conditions, exclusions, and limitations of
our liability, stated in this policy,
we will pay the reasonable
charges for necessary goods and services
for the treatment of bodily injury
sustained by an insured, if such
bodily injury directly results from an
accident caused by the
occupancy, use, or
maintenance of an auto. The
reasonable charges must be incurred
within two years of the accident date.
Subject to the limit of our liability for
this coverage stated in the Declarations,
we will pay the reasonable
charges for funeral services of an
insured, if death directly results from an
accident caused by the
occupancy, use, or
maintenance of an auto. The
reasonable charges must be incurred
within two years of the accident date.
(Dkt. No. 14, ¶ 9) (emphasis in original).
The
Policy of insurance contains the following definition of an
“insured” applicable to medical payments
coverage:
DEFINITION OF INSURED USED IN COVERAGE C
In Coverage C insured means
you or a relative.
Insured also means:
***
(2) Individuals, other than those
occupying a vehicle, who are
struck by the described
auto, while they are:
(a) Pedestrians;
(b) Bicyclists;
(c) Motorcyclists;
(d) In a horse-drawn wagon or cart; or
(e) Riding on an animal.
(Id.) (emphasis in original).
Shelter
asserts that the definition of an “insured”
applicable to accident death benefits coverage is the same as
the definition applicable to medical payments coverage:
DEFINITION OF INSURED USED IN COVERAGE D
In Coverage D insured means
you or a relative.
Insured can also mean:
***
(2) Individuals, other than those
occupying a vehicle, who are
struck by the described
auto, while they are:
(a) Pedestrians;
(b) Bicyclists;
(c) Motorcyclists;
(d) In a horse-drawn wagon or cart; or
(e) Riding on an animal.
(Dkt. No. 10, ¶ 12) (emphasis in original).
Shelter
further asserts that the Policy also contains the following
definitions applicable to medical payments and funeral
benefits, accidental death benefits, as well as uninsured
motorist benefits:
“You” is defined in the Policy
as “any person listed as a
named insured in the
Declarations and, if that
person is an individual,
his or her spouse.”
“Relative”[] as defined in the
Policy “means an individual related to
you by blood, marriage, or adoption, who is
a resident of your
household.” “Passenger” is also defined as
an “insured” under the Policy, but the terms does
[sic] not include the driver:
“Passenger means an
individual who is occupying
one of the seats of a vehicle with
permission but does not include the
operator of a vehicle.”
(Id., ¶ 13) (emphasis in original).
Shelter
contends that there is no dispute that Mr. Smith was
occupying the insured vehicle as the driver but was not the
named insured, a relative of the named insured, a member of
the named insured's household, nor a “passenger,
” “pedestrian, ” “bicyclist, ”
“motorcyclist, ” or traveling “in a
horse-drawn wagon or cart” (Dkt. No. 10, ¶ 17).
Ms. Neighbors disputes whether Mr. Smith was a member of the
insured's household at the time of the accident as she
claims that she has been unable to investigate adequately
that aspect of Ms. Ferebee and Mr. Smith's relationship
(Dkt. No. 14, ¶ 14). Ms. Neighbors does not dispute that
Mr. Smith was occupying the insured vehicle as the driver
just prior to the accident, but she disputes that Mr. Smith
was occupying the vehicle as a driver at all subsequent times
and at the time he was struck by Ms. Ferebee's insured
vehicle as alleged in paragraph 17 of Shelter's statement
of undisputed material facts (Id.). Ms. Neighbors
submits that the applicable statutes do not define
“passenger, ” “pedestrian, ”
“bicyclist, ” “motorcyclist, ” or
traveling “in a horse-drawn wagon or cart” but
merely provide coverage to “persons other than those
occupying another vehicle struck by the insured motor
vehicle” (Id.).
Shelter
argues that Ms. Neighbors does not allege that Shelter
wrongfully applied the terms of the Policy with regard to the
definition of “insured” under the medical
payments or accidental death benefits (Dkt. No. 10, ¶
21). Ms. Neighbors disputes that assertion and contends that
Shelter's actions and its policy are contrary, on their
face, to the requirements of Arkansas law (Dkt. No. 14,
¶ 19).
3.
Applicable Arkansas Statutes
Shelter
argues that the Policy at issue mirrors the requirements of
the applicable statutes, Arkansas Code Annotated §§
23-89-202 and 23-89-204 (Dkt. No. 10, ¶ 14). According
to Shelter, for coverage to apply, the applicable statute
Arkansas Code Annotated § 23-89-202 requires that the
deceased be “the named insured, ” a
“member[] of the [named insured's] family residing
in the same household, ” a “passenger[] injured
while occupying the insured motor vehicle, ” and a
“person[] other than those occupying another vehicle
struck by the insured motor vehicle” (Id.,
¶ 15). Shelter asserts that, in order for accidental
death benefits to apply, the statute continues to require
that the deceased be an “insured” under the
Policy (Id.). Shelter submits that the statute
states, in pertinent part, that “[t]he sum of five
thousand dollars ($5, 000)[] to be paid to the personal
representative of the insured . . .
[]” (Id.) (emphasis in original). Shelter
further submits that coverage required to be provided to
“insured” under Arkansas Code Annotated §
23-89-202 also applies “only
to occupants of the insured vehicle and to persons struck by
the insured vehicle, including
pedestrians, bicyclists, motorcyclists, persons in a
horse-drawn wagon or cart, and persons riding on an animal,
and to none other”
(Id., ¶ 16) (emphasis in original).
Ms.
Neighbors does not dispute that the definition in the Policy
at issue provides that an “insured” for
accidental death benefits is the same as the definition
applicable to medical payments coverage, but she disputes
that the definition is co-extensive with the requirements of
Arkansas law and asserts that it is contrary to Arkansas Code
Annotated §§ 23-89-202 and 23-89-204 (Dkt. No. 14,
¶ 10). Similarly, Ms. Neighbors does not dispute that
such language is contained in the Policy at issue but
disputes that the cited language is co-extensive with the
requirements of Arkansas law and asserts that it is contrary
to Arkansas Code Annotated §§ 23-89-202 and
23-89-204 (Id., ¶ 11). Ms. Neighbors disputes
that the Policy at issue mirrors the requirements of the
applicable statutes Arkansas Code Annotated §§
23-89-202 and 23-89-204 because, for coverage to apply, the
applicable statute Arkansas Code Annotated § 23-89-202
requires that Mr. Smith be “the named insured, ”
“members of [the named insured's] family residing
in the same household, ” a “passenger[] injured
while occupying the insured motor vehicle, and a
“person[] other than those occupying another vehicle
struck by the insured motor vehicle” (Id.,
¶ 12).
Ms.
Neighbors submits that, specifically, Mr. Smith need only
meet one of these classes of persons to be insured pursuant
to the statute, not all as indicated by Shelter's
misquoting of the statute (Id.). Ms. Neighbors
asserts that Mr. Smith becomes an insured under Arkansas law
by meeting any one of the definitions provided in the
statute, just as he does for the accidental death benefits to
apply (Id.). Further, Ms. Neighbors submits that
coverage required to be provided to an “insured”
under Arkansas Code Annotated § 23-89-202 also applies
“only to occupants of the insured vehicle and to
persons struck by the insured vehicle, including pedestrians,
bicyclists, motorcyclists, persons in a horse-drawn wagon or
cart, and persons riding on an animal, and to none
other” (Id., ¶ 13).
According
to Ms. Neighbors, Arkansas Code Annotated § 23-89-204(a)
speaks for itself (Id.). Ms. Neighbors argues that
Shelter encourages a strained reading of the statute that by
“including” certain classes of persons, it
excludes all others (Id.). Ms. Neighbors asserts
that Shelter's strained interpretation of Arkansas Code
Annotated ยง 23-89-204(a)'s meaning as set out in
paragraph 16 of its statement of undisputed material facts is
disputed, citing ...