Smith v. Berryhill

          ORDER

          HON. BARRY A. BRYANT U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

         Pending now before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). ECF No. 16. Defendant responded to this Motion; and apart from her claim that Plaintiff's requested rate for 2016 and 2017 was excessive, she raised no objections to this Motion. ECF No. 17. The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 5. Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this Order.

         1. Background

         On November 2, 2017, Perry D. Smith (“Plaintiff”) appealed to the Court from the Secretary of the Social Security Administration's (“SSA”) denial of his request for disability benefits. ECF No. 1. On January 10, 2019, Plaintiff case was reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ECF Nos. 14-15.

         On March 21, 2019, Plaintiff filed this Motion. ECF No. 16. With this Motion, Plaintiff requests an award of $4, 135.60. Id. This includes 21.1 total hours from 2016 through 2019 at an hourly rate of $196.00. Id. Defendant has responded to this Motion. ECF No. 17. In this response, Defendant only objects to Plaintiff's requested hourly rate for 2016 and 2017 and seeks to reduce Plaintiff's requested amount to $4, 124.00. Id.

         2. Applicable Law:

         Pursuant to the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), a court must award attorney's fees to a prevailing social security claimant unless the Secretary's position in denying benefits was substantially justified. The Secretary has the burden of proving that the denial of benefits was substantially justified. See Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.1986) (“The Secretary bears the burden of proving that its position in the administrative and judicial proceedings below was substantially justified”). An EAJA application also must be made within thirty days of a final judgment in an action, See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), or within thirty days after the sixty day time for appeal has expired. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 298 (1993).

         An award of attorney's fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though, at the conclusion of the case, the plaintiff's attorney may be authorized to charge and to collect a fee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney's fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002) (citing Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 186 (1985)). The United States Supreme Court stated that Congress harmonized an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA and under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) as follows:

Fee awards may be made under both prescriptions [EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)], but the claimant's attorney must “refun[d] to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.”. . .“Thus, an EAJA award offsets an award under Section 406(b), so that the [amount of total past-due benefits the claimant actually receives] will be increased by the . . . EAJA award up to the point the claimant receives 100 percent of the past-due benefits.”

Id. Furthermore, awarding fees under both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the prevailing party's litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action. See id.; Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 986 (8th Cir. 1984).

         The statutory ceiling for an EAJA fee award is $125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). A court is only authorized to exceed this statutory rate if “the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” Id. A court may determine that there has been an increase in the cost of living, and may thereby increase the attorney's rate per hour, based upon the United States Department of Labor's Consumer Price Index (“CPI”). See Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 504 (8th Cir. 1990). See also General Order 39 (“Attorney's Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act”).

         3. Discussion:

         In the present action, Plaintiff's case was remanded to the SSA. ECF Nos. 14-15. Defendant does not contest Plaintiff's claim that he is the prevailing party and does not oppose his application for fees under the EAJA. ECF No. 17. The Court construes the lack of opposition to this application as an admission that the government's decision to deny benefits was not “substantially justified” and that Plaintiff is the prevailing party.

         Plaintiff requests a total award of $4, 135.60. ECF No. 16. This includes 21.1 total hours from 2016 through 2019 at an hourly rate of $196.00. Id. This attorney hourly rate is authorized by the EAJA as long as the CPI-South Index justifies this enhanced rate. See General Order 39. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Johnson, 919 F.2d at 504. In the present action, the Court finds the CPI-South Index authorizes $188.00 for 2016, $192.00 for 2017, and $196.00 for 2018 and 2019. Thus, the Court awards those hourly rates. Plaintiff has also requested 1.2 attorney hours for 2016, 1.9 attorney hours for 2017, and ...