United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Fort Smith Division
OPINION AND ORDER
P. K.
HOLMES, III U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
The
case is before the Court for preservice screening under the
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court has the
obligation to screen any Complaint in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of
a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
Teddy Edwards (“Edwards”) filed a Complaint under
42 U.S.C § 1983 on January 25, 2019. (ECF No. 1). The
Complaint listed the following Defendants: Sheriff Jimmy
Stevens, Lisa Haddelstor, and Johnson County Regional Medical
Center. (Id.). Edwards alleges one claim: denial of
medical care. (Id.). He also mentions the denial of
a grievance process, and the Court will construe this as an
additional claim. (Id.). He supports his denial of
medical care claim by stating that his severe injuries from
an auto accident required the attention of a medical doctor,
as opposed to an allegedly unqualified nurse that was on
staff. (Id.). He is suing Separate Defendants
Stevens and Haddelstor in both their official and personal
capacities. (Id.). For his official capacity claim,
he states the following policy or custom violated his rights:
“By not providing me with my grievances to document my
plea for medical treatment and the form that shows the monies
on my books to pay for this motion, it unduly prejudices my
plea.” (Id.).
Edwards
requests relief in the form of compensatory and punitive
damages, stating his ability to work was diminished by the
lack of medical care. (Id.). He is requesting $700,
000.00, calculated from his average earnings of $35, 000.00
per year across 20 years. (Id.).
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under
the PLRA, the Court is obliged to screen the case prior to
service of process being issued. The Court must dismiss a
Complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that:
(1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b).
A claim
is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in
law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro
se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a
claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Jackson
v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Even a
pro se plaintiff must allege specific facts
sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent,
780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
Johnson County Regional Medical Center
Section
1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation,
under color of law, of a citizen's “rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws” of the United States. In order to state a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the
defendant acted under color of state law and violated a right
secured by the Constitution. West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007,
1009 (8th Cir. 1999). The deprivation must be intentional;
mere negligence will not suffice to state a claim for
deprivation of a constitutional right under § 1983.
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986);
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
Plaintiff's
claims against Johnson County Regional Medical Center are
subject to dismissal. In Montano v. Hedgepeth, 120
F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1997), the Eighth Circuit set forth the
analysis to be applied in determining whether state action
exists for purposes of § 1983. Specifically, the Court
said:
In ascertaining the presence of state action, we must examine
the record to determine whether “the conduct allegedly
causing the deprivation of a federal right [is] fairly
attributable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753, 73 L.Ed.2d
482 (1982). Resolving this question entails a journey down a
particularly fact-bound path, see id. at 939, 102
S.Ct. at 2754-55, but the Supreme Court has identified two
legal touchstones to provide guidance along the way. To begin
with, there can be no “fair attribution” unless
the alleged constitutional violation was “caused by the
exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or
by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for
whom the State is responsible.” Id. at 937,
102 S.Ct. at 2753. Furthermore, “the party charged with
the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be
a state actor. This may be because he is a state official,
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