United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Hot Springs Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF A UNITED STATES
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
HON.
BARRY A. BRYANT U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before
the Court is the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
ECF No. 22. Plaintiff has responded. ECF No. 26. This Motion
was referred to the undersigned for a report and
recommendation, and this Motion is now ripe for
consideration.
I.
Background:
This is
an action to recover unpaid overtime wages pursuant to the
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.,
and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (“AMWA”), Ark.
Code Ann. § 11-4-201, et seq. Defendants
Charles and Shon Knabe own and operate Country Inn, Inc.
(“Country Inn”), a lakeside resort located in Hot
Springs, Arkansas. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 10-15. Plaintiff
was employed as an office manager at Country Inn from
approximately July 2017 through February 2018. Id.
at ¶¶ 20-21. Plaintiff lived in a company owned
apartment on the premises of the Country Inn. Id. at
¶ 28. In addition to the company owned apartment,
Plaintiff was also paid $400.00 per week for her job.
Id. at ¶ 35.
Plaintiff
alleges her job duties included “checking in guests,
checking out guests, cleaning the resort, answering the
telephone and taking reservations.” Id. at
¶ 22. Plaintiff also claims she “regularly booked
reservations via telephone and/or the internet” during
her tenure at Country Inn. Id. at ¶ 23.
Plaintiff further alleges she was issued a company cell phone
that she was required to keep at all times. Id. at
¶ 31-32. According to Plaintiff, part of her official
job duties included being available “in case the
company cell phone rang and to answer the company cell phone
when it rang.” Id. at ¶ 33.
On July
11, 2018, this Court granted Defendants partial summary
judgment on the issue of enterprise coverage, ruling that
Defendants' evidence on summary judgment established the
motel's annual revenue of less than the $500, 000
threshold of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii). ECF No. 15.
The Court denied Defendants' request to dismiss
Plaintiffs' claims regarding the existence of individual
FLSA coverage because discovery might yield additional facts
regarding the nature and extent of Plaintiff's job duties
at Country Inn. Id. The Court indicated it would
entertain a motion for summary judgment on the issue once the
parties had concluded discovery. Id.
On
February 27, 2019, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary
Judgment on Plaintiff's FLSA claiming (1) Plaintiff's
position at the Country Inn was exempt from FLSA coverage
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 and (2) Plaintiff has no
FLSA individual coverage because discovery has yielded no
facts tending to show Plaintiff was engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce. ECF No. 22.
2.
Applicable Law:
Pursuant
to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal
court is authorized to grant summary judgment in a case.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A genuine issue of material
fact exists only if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The
moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no
genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The burden then
shifts to the nonmoving party to show through specific
evidence that a triable issue of fact remains on an issue
where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial.
Id. at 324. A mere scintilla of evidence in support
of the nonmovant's position is insufficient.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
To
survive a motion for summary judgment, “a nonmovant
must present more than a scintilla of evidence and must
advance specific facts to create a genuine issue of material
fact for trial.” Parks v. City of Horseshoe Bend,
Arkansas, 480 F.3d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted). As stated in this rule, “[w]hen a motion for
summary judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing
party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its
own pleading; rather, its response must-by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule-set out specific facts
showing a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
3.
Discussion:
The
FLSA provides for two types of coverage: (1) individual
employee coverage, and (2) enterprise coverage.[1] 29 U.S.C. §
206. “To adequately plead individual coverage under the
FLSA, plaintiffs must allege that, at times relevant to their
claim, they were ‘engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce.'” Shorts v.
Primeco Auto Towing, L.L.C., No. CIV.A. H-13-2794, 2014
WL 3670004, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 22, 2014) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 207(a)(2)(C)). “Either individual or
enterprise coverage is enough to invoke FLSA
protection.” Landeros v. Fu King, Inc., 12
F.Supp.3d 1020, 1032 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (citing Martin v.
Bedell, 955 F.2d 1029, 1032 (5th Cir. 1992)).
In
their Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's FLSA
claim, Defendants argue (1) Plaintiff's position at the
Country Inn was exempt from FLSA coverage pursuant to 29
C.F.R. § 785.23 and (2) Plaintiff has no FLSA individual
coverage because she was ...