United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Western Division
OPINION AND ORDER
J.
LEON HOLMES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Judith
Vaughan began working for Crain Automotive Holdings, LLC in
the fall of 2016. Vaughan suffers from anxiety, depression,
and panic attacks, although no one at Crain knew this prior
to the events giving rise to this lawsuit. Late in the day on
Monday, January 30, 2017, Vaughan began experiencing chest
pains and went to the emergency room, fearing she was having
a heart attack. After two days of treatment Vaughan learned
her chest pain had been the result of a panic attack. She
ultimately reported back to work on Friday, but she began
experiencing a panic attack and left work, after emailing her
supervisor. When Vaughan returned to work the following
Tuesday, she met with two supervisors, Kim Lynch and Debbie
Pumphrey, and was terminated. According to Vaughan, she was
told at this meeting that “it was not working
out” due to her health problems and that she needed to
take care of herself.
The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought this action
asserting that Crain violated the Americans with Disabilities
Act, as amended by the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act of 2008. The complaint alleges that Crain
failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for Vaughan and
that it discharged her because of her disabilities. Crain has
moved for summary judgment on both of the EEOC's claims.
For the reasons that will be explained, the motion is denied.
A court
should enter summary judgment if the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511,
91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Torgerson v. City of
Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en
banc). A genuine dispute of material fact exists only if the
evidence is sufficient to allow a jury to return a verdict
for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249,
106 S.Ct. at 2511.
The ADA
prohibits discrimination against a “‘qualified
individual with a disability' because of the
disability.” Scruggs v. Pulaski Cnty., Ark.,
817 F.3d 1087, 1092 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bahl v.
Cnty. of Ramsey, 695 F.3d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 2012)).
Unless
a plaintiff has direct evidence of discrimination, an ADA
discrimination claim is judged under the three-part
McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework.
Oehmke v. Medtronic, Inc., 844 F.3d 748, 755 (8th
Cir. 2016). Under this framework, the plaintiff has the
initial burden of showing that she was disabled within the
meaning of the ADA, that she was qualified to perform the
essential functions of the job, and a causal connection
between an adverse employment action and her disability.
Id. at 755. If the plaintiff meets her burden of
establishing a prima facie case, the burden of production
shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
Id. If the defendant provides such a reason for the
adverse employment action, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to show that the proffered reason is a pretext for
discrimination. Id.
If
there is direct evidence of disability discrimination,
however, the McDonnell Douglas analysis does not
apply. St. Martin v. City of St. Paul, 680 F.3d
1027, 1033 (8th Cir. 2012). Direct evidence is evidence that
shows a specific link between the discriminatory animus and
the adverse employment action, which is sufficient for a
reasonable jury to find that an illegitimate criterion
actually motivated the adverse employment action.
Id. Thus, “direct” refers to the causal
strength of the proof. Id.; Torgerson v. City of
Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1044 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(explaining that evidence that clearly points to the presence
of an illegal motive would qualify as direct evidence). If
direct evidence of discrimination exists, a plaintiff may get
to the jury based on that evidence alone. See Griffith v.
City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004).
In this
case, Crain first disputes that Vaughan is disabled within
the meaning of the ADA. Under the ADA, a person is disabled
if he or she has “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life
activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Before the
2008 amendments to the ADA, courts strictly interpreted the
terms “major life activities” and
“substantially limits, ” creating a demanding
standard for qualifying as disabled. See Nyrop v.
Independent Sch. Dist. No. 11, 616 F.3d 728, 734 (8th
Cir. 2010). The 2008 amendments, however, “broadened
the definition of what constitutes a disability and rejected
the strict standards” from before. Id. at 734
n.4; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). Now
“substantially limits” is not demanding, and it
“shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive
coverage.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i).
Here,
it is undisputed that Vaughan has been diagnosed with
anxiety, depression, and panic attacks. Taking Vaughan's
version of the facts as true, her panic attacks make her feel
paralyzed, cause chest pain, and cause difficulty with her
breathing, thinking, communicating with others, and
reasoning. Document #30-4 at 1. Her anxiety causes her to
have difficulty breathing and communicating and an inability
to think coherently. Id. When she suffers from
depression, she is unable to care for herself, communicate
with others, or think coherently. Id. The ADA
specifically includes thinking, breathing, and communicating
as “major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(A) - (B); see also 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(i)(2) (“In determining other examples of major
life activities, the term ‘major' shall not be
interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for
disability.”). Whether an individual's impairment
“substantially limits” the identified
“major life activity” is a question of fact for
the jury. Sanchez v. Vilsack, 695 F.3d 1174, 1178
(10th Cir. 2012); Goal v. Retzer Resources, Inc.,
2010 WL 4867966, *4, 5:09-CV-00137 JLH (E.D. Ark. Nov. 3,
2010) (“This evidence creates a material question of
fact as to whether Goal's impairment substantially limits
a major life activity.”); Morrow v. City of
Jacksonville, Ark., 941 F.Supp. 816, 823 (E.D. Ark.
1996) (“[T]he Court concludes that whether the
plaintiff's [identified impairment]
‘substantially limits' her life activity
of ‘working' is a question of fact for the
jury.”).
Crain
points out that Vaughan has been able to perform other
demanding activities, such as handle her parents'
estates. Crain also notes that Vaughan does not have panic
attacks constantly. Crain further argues that Vaughan has
testified that she has tried to work through a panic that
occurred at work. But these facts, even if true, do not mean
that Vaughan is not disabled under the EEOC laws. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(viii) (“An impairment that
substantially limits one major life activity need not
substantially limit other major life activities in order to
be considered a substantially limiting impairment.”);
id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) (if an impairment is
episodic, it “is a disability if it would substantially
limit a major life activity when active”); id.
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (“An impairment need not
prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the
individual from performing a major life activity in order to
be considered substantially limiting.”). In light of
Vaughan's testimony regarding the difficulty her
impairments cause her, and Congress's intention to
“broaden[] the definition of what constitutes a
disability, ” a reasonable jury could find that Vaughan
is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Nyrop,
616 F.3d at 734 n.4; see also 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(j)(i) (“‘Substantially limits' is not
meant to be a demanding standard, ” and it “shall
be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.”).
Crain
next argues that even if Vaughan is disabled, she could not
have been fired because of her disability since Crain did not
know about it. In response, the EEOC has presented the
following evidence: on Tuesday Vaughan told her supervisor
Pumphrey she had experienced chest pains on Monday; on
Wednesday Vaughan told Pumphrey she had anxiety, depression,
and had suffered a panic attack; on Friday Vaughan emailed
Pumphrey before leaving work, saying “I can't do
this” because she was “still hurting too
bad”; on Friday Vaughan emailed another supervisor,
Lynch, explaining that she had had a heart catheterization
and she included a doctor's note in the email; and on
Friday Vaughan emailed Lynch that she had left early because
she “was having another panic attack.” Document
#30-6 at 13, 16; Document #28-8; Document #28-9. Taking all
these facts as true, a reasonable jury could infer that, at
the time Vaughan was fired the following Tuesday, Crain knew
about her anxiety, depression, and panic attacks. Moreover, a
jury could find that Crain had some knowledge of the extent
of Vaughan's impairments, as they had caused her chest
pain resulting in a heart catheterization as well as missing
several days of work.
Finally,
Crain argues the EEOC has no direct evidence of
discrimination, and under the McDonnell-Douglas
framework, the disability claim cannot survive.
Employer
actions or remarks that reflect a discriminatory attitude,
comments that demonstrate a discriminatory animus in the
decisional process, or comments made by individuals closely
involved in employment decisions may all constitute direct
evidence of discrimination. See King v. United
States, 553 F.3d 1156, 1161 (8th Cir. 2009). In
contrast, “stray remarks in the workplace, statements
by nondecisionmakers, and statements by decisionmakers
unrelated to the decisional process do not constitute direct
evidence.” Id. at 1160 (citations and internal
quotations omitted). Likewise, if employer comments are made
with the intent of attempting to preserve and promote an
employee, they are less likely to constitute direct evidence
of a discriminatory animus. Twymon v. Wells Fargo &
Co., 462 F.3d 925, 934 (8th Cir. 2006).
Here,
Vaughan met with two supervisors on Tuesday, February 8, in
order to discuss why she had left work early on Friday.
Instead, she was fired. Vaughan has testified that at this
meeting, a supervisor told her that “due to [her]
health, it wasn't going to work out and [she] should take
time for [her]self.” Document #30-6 at 8. This
comment[1] is direct evidence of discrimination. If a
jury found that Vaughan is disabled, and it believed these
facts, it could draw the inference that an illegitimate
criterion - Vaughan's disability - actually motivated her
firing. The supervisor's comment is a far cry from
“stray remarks in the workplace, statements by
nondecisionmakers, and statements by decisionmakers unrelated
to the decisional process.” See King, 553 F.3d
at 1160. Instead, the comment was made during the meeting in
which Vaughan was fired, it was made by Vaughan's
supervisor, and it relates directly to the decision to fire
Vaughan. See Id. at 1161. There is no reason to
suspect that the suggestion that Vaughan should take care of
her health or take time for herself was made “with the
intent of attempting to ...