United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Hot Springs Division
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
BARRY A. BRYANT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
proceeds in this matter pro se and in forma
pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Â§ 636(b)(1) and (3)(2011), the
Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District
Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose
of making a Report and Recommendation.
case is before the Court for preservice screening under the
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court has the
obligation to screen any Complaint in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of
a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)
filed his Complaint in the Eastern District of Arkansas on
January 24, 2019. (ECF No. 1). It was transferred to this
District on February 7, 2019. (ECF No. 4). On February 8,
2019, the Court entered an Order directing Plaintiff to file
an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff did so on
February 19, 2019. (ECF No. 8).
alleges Defendant violated his constitutional rights on
November 7, 2018, when they arrested him eight days before he
was to report for a twenty-year sentence in the Arkansas
Department of Correction (“ADC”). (ECF No. 8 at
3, 8-10). Plaintiff alleges that on November 7, 2018, he was
on house arrest with an ankle monitor. (Id. at 3,
8-9). He called Arkadelphia 911 to report the presence of an
unwanted person in his house and that someone had put sugar
water in the gas tank of his vehicle. (Id. at 8).
When the police arrived, they arrested him, telling he was
being taken for evaluation and that they were “just
following orders.” (Id. at 9). He was placed
in the visitation room for a few hours, at which time Jail
Administrator Barnes told him his bond was being revoked.
(Id.). When Plaintiff protested, stating that it was
part of his plea agreement that he be released on an ankle
monitor until November 15, 2018, Barnes told him “at
least you['re] not getting a new charge.”
(Id. at 10). Plaintiff alleges he was then
transported to the ADC somewhere between three days and forty
hours after the arrest. (Id.).
believes his bond was revoked by Defendants in retaliation
for filing a § 1983 case with this Court in Turner
v. Watson, case number 6:18-cv-06068. Plaintiff filed
this prior § 1983 case against Sheriff Watson, Jail
Administrator Barnes, and other Defendants on August 6, 2018.
The case was served on August 7, 2018, and the Answer was
filed on August 30, 2018.
the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to
service of process being issued. The Court must dismiss a
complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that:
(1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or, (2) seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in
law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro
se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a
claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Jackson
v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Even a
pro se Plaintiff must allege specific facts
sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent,
780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
failed to state any cognizable official capacity claims.
Under § 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his
individual capacity, or in his official capacity, or in both.
In Gorman v.Bartch, 152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998),
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the distinction
between individual and official capacity suits. As explained
by the Court in Gorman:
“Claims against government actors in their individual
capacities differ from those in their official capacities as
to the type of conduct that is actionable and as to the type
of defense that is available. See Hafer v. Melo, 502
U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). Claims
against individuals in their official capacities are
equivalent to claims against the entity for which they work;
they require proof that a policy or custom of the entity
violated the plaintiff's rights, and the only type of
immunity available is one belonging to the entity itself.
Id. 502 U.S. at 24-27, 112 S.Ct. at 361-62 (1991).
Personal capacity claims, on the other hand, are those which
allege personal liability for individual actions by ...