United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Pine Bluff Division
ORDER
Kristine G. Baker, United States District Judge.
The
Court has received a Recommended Partial Disposition
submitted by United States Magistrate Judge J. Thomas Ray
(Dkt. No. 11). Plaintiff Montrell Dashone Ventry filed
objections (Dkt. No. 15). After careful review of the
Recommended Partial Disposition and Mr. Ventry's
objections, as well as a de novo review of the
record, the Court adopts the Recommended Partial Disposition
in its entirety as this Court's findings (Dkt. No. 11).
I.
Objections
Mr.
Ventry objects to Judge Ray's recommendation that the
Court dismiss without prejudice Mr. Ventry's claims
against defendants Rory L. Griffin and Correct Care Solutions
Corporation (“Correct Care”) (Dkt. No. 15, ¶
2). The Court addresses in turn Mr. Ventry's objections
as to each defendant.
A.
Rory L. Griffin
Judge
Ray recommended that the Court dismiss without prejudice Mr.
Ventry's claims against Mr. Griffin because, as a
supervisor, Mr. Griffin cannot be held vicariously liable in
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on a respondeat
superior theory, and Mr. Ventry's only allegation
against Mr. Griffin is that, as the Arkansas Department of
Correction (“ADC”) Deputy Director for Health and
Correction Services, Mr. Griffin is “legally
responsible for the overall operations” of ADC's
health services (Dkt. No. 11, at 4-5).
Mr.
Ventry objects to Judge Ray's recommendation that the
Court dismiss without prejudice Mr. Ventry's claims
against Mr. Griffin (Dkt. No. 15, ¶ 2). Mr. Ventry first
argues that he filed a motion to appoint counsel to assist
him with his claims due to a number of defendants, including
Mr. Griffin and Correct Care, being supervisory officials
(Dkt. No. 15, ¶¶ 5-6).
Mr.
Ventry next contends that Mr. Griffin is the Director for
Health and Correction Services as well as the last step in
the appeal process for the administrative grievances
(Id., ¶ 14). Mr. Ventry asserts that his
grievances containing allegations against defendants Mary
Seals, Andria Leah Anne Cantrell, and LaSonya Griswold were
forwarded to Mr. Griffin, that Mr. Griffin relied on false
and misleading information in response to the grievances, and
that Mr. Griffin failed to investigate the facts alleged
within the grievances (Id., ¶¶ 15-17). Mr.
Ventry also objects to Mr. Griffin's written responses to
Mr. Ventry's grievances during the appeal process
(Id., ¶¶ 18-30).
According
to Mr. Ventry, the custom of allowing medical beds inside
ward cells unequipped with sufficient nursing alert devices
subjected Mr. Ventry to cruel and unusual punishment
(Id., ¶ 42). Mr. Ventry submits that, instead
of Mr. Griffin or Correct Care remedying the wrong, the
responsibility for such lack of medical device was placed on
the ADC and specifically on defendants Wendy Kelley and
William Straughn (Id.).
The
Court first notes that Judge Ray denied Mr. Ventry's
motion to appoint counsel (Dkt. No. 12). Mr. Ventry filed a
motion for reconsideration of the motion to appoint counsel
(Dkt. No. 17), on which Judge Ray has not yet ruled. Mr.
Ventry is not constitutionally entitled to the appointment of
counsel in this civil case.
As to
Mr. Ventry's objections regarding Mr. Griffin's role
as the Director for Health and Correction Services as well as
his role in the grievance appeal process, Judge Ray explained
in the Recommended Partial Disposition that it is well
settled that a supervisor may not be held vicariously liable
in a § 1983 action on a respondeat superior
theory. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009);
see also Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d 1309, 1314 (8th
Cir. 1997). To state a cognizable claim against a defendant
in a supervisory role, a prisoner plaintiff must allege that
the defendant was personally involved in the constitutional
violation or became aware of the constitutional violation
and, with deliberate indifference, failed to take corrective
action. Choate v. Lockhart, 7 F.3d 1370, 1376 (8th
Cir. 1993). In addition, a “general responsibility for
supervising the operations of a prison is insufficient to
establish the personal involvement required to support
liability.” Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174,
176 (8th Cir. 1995).
Mr.
Ventry makes no allegations against Mr. Griffin in his
complaint, declaration in support of complaint, or memorandum
of law in support of complaint beyond that Mr. Griffin is
“legally responsible for the overall operations”
of the ADC's health services (Dkt. Nos. 2, 3, 4).
Similarly, Mr. Ventry's complaint, declaration in support
of complaint, and memorandum of law contain no basis in fact
for his allegation in his objections that there was a
“custom” of allowing medical beds inside ward
cells unequipped with sufficient nursing alert devices
thereby subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment. Mr.
Ventry filed a grievance stating that the ward he was placed
in did not have an alert system (Dkt. No. 2, at 36). In his
appeal of that grievance, Mr. Ventry stated that the Cummins
Unit ward cells lack the proper medical alert systems
(Id., at 38). Mr. Ventry's current allegations
do not satisfy the pleading requirements for stating an
actionable claim against Mr. Griffin. Mr. Ventry acknowledges
that Mr. Griffin informed Mr. Ventry through his decision
that the ADC is responsible for providing medical equipment
such as call lights (Dkt. No. 15, ¶ 42; Dkt. No. 2, at
40). To the extent that Mr. Ventry is pursuing that issue,
ADC defendants Ms. Kelley and Mr. Straughn remain defendants
in this action. For these reasons, the Court agrees with
Judge Ray's recommendation and dismisses without
prejudice Mr. Ventry's claims against Mr. Griffin.
B.
Correct Care Solutions Corporation
Judge
Ray also recommended that the Court dismiss without prejudice
Mr. Ventry's claims against Correct Care because a
corporation acting under color of state law can be held
liable only for its unconstitutional policies or practices,
and Mr. Ventry did not allege any policy, ...