United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Pine Bluff Division
WILLIAM COOKSEY, JR. and JOHN WILLIAMS PLAINTIFFS
v.
PROFESSIONAL TRANSPORTATION, INC., et al. DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Kristine G. Baker United States District Judge
Before
the Court is a declaration of bill of costs filed by separate
defendant Professional Transportation Inc.
(“PTI”) (Dkt. No. 97). PTI filed a memorandum in
support with an itemization of costs (Dkt. No. 98). Plaintiff
William Cooksey, Jr., filed a response in opposition (Dkt.
No. 99). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants in
part and denies in part PTI's bill of costs. The Court
shall tax costs in favor of PTI, and against Mr. Cooksey, in
the amount of $8, 893.55.
I.
Background
This
action arises out of a complaint filed on March 3, 2016, by
plaintiffs Mr. Cooksey and John Williams alleging that
defendants racially discriminated against their African
American employees by paying Caucasian employees a higher
wage for similar work (Dkt. No. 1). On August 29, 2016, Mr.
Williams moved to dismiss his claims (Dkt. No. 23), and the
Court granted his motion (Dkt. No. 69). On September 29,
2017, this Court entered an Order and Judgment granting
summary judgment in favor of defendants and dismissing with
prejudice Mr. Cooksey's claims (Dkt. Nos. 95, 96). PTI
then filed a declaration of bill of costs asking the Court to
tax $9, 406.45 in costs, though PTI does not specify which
plaintiff should be taxed for which costs.
II.
Discussion
Recovery
of costs in the district court is generally governed by
statute and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Pershern v. Fiatallis N. Am., Inc., 834 F.2d 136,
140 (8th Cir. 1987). Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure states that “[u]nless a federal
statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise,
costs-other than attorney's fees-should be allowed to the
prevailing party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54. “To rebut the
presumption that the prevailing party is entitled to recover
all of its costs, the district court must provide a rationale
for denying the prevailing party's claim for
costs.” Thompson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 472
F.3d 515, 517 (8th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, the Court may tax costs for:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts
necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies
of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained
for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of
interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of
special interpretation services under section 1828 of this
title.
28 U.S.C. § 1920. “‘Absent explicit
statutory or contractual authorization to the contrary,
federal district courts may tax as costs only those expenses
listed in § 1920.'” U.S. v. Mink, 476
F.3d 558, 564 (8th Cir. 2007) (alteration omitted) (quoting
United States v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114, 1142 (8th
Cir. 1990)).
“[N]ot
all expenses of litigation are costs taxable against the
losing party, and within the statutory framework of costs
eligible to be taxed, the district court has discretion in
determining and awarding costs in a given case.”
Pershern, 834 F.2d at 140. “An award of costs
may be reduced or denied because the prevailing party
obtained only a nominal victory, or because the taxable costs
of the litigation were disproportionate to the result
achieved.” Richmond v. SouthwireCo.,
980 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Farmer v.
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