APPEAL
FROM THE CRAWFORD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 17CR-16-993]
HONORABLE GARY COTTRELL, JUDGE.
Lisa-Marie Norris, for appellant.
Leslie
Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: David L. Eanes, Jr., Ass't
Att'y Gen., for appellee.
MEREDITH B. SWITZER, JUDGE.
Eliot
Pargament appeals from his conviction of possession of
marijuana. As his sole point of appeal, he contends the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the
State failed to prove there was a valid traffic stop. We
agree and reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
Trooper
Josh Elmore of the Arkansas State Police testified that on
the night in question, he was driving east in the left lane
on Interstate 40. He observed Pargament's vehicle, a
black vehicle, in the right lane. He explained that a white
vehicle pulled in front of Pargament's vehicle, and at
that point, Pargament was driving too closely to the white
vehicle. Elmore said he followed Pargament for "a little
bit" before turning on his lights, giving Pargament the
opportunity to either change lanes and go around the white
vehicle or reduce his speed, but Pargament continued in the
same lane at the same speed. He did not recall how fast
either vehicle was going, but it was not considerably slower
or faster than the speed limit, which was seventy miles an
hour. Based on his training and experience, Elmore believed
if the front vehicle stopped quickly, a vehicle following
within that distance and at that speed would cause an
accident.
On
cross-examination, Elmore clarified that he was initially
following the white vehicle in the left-hand lane but that it
then pulled over into the right-hand lane in front of
Pargament's black vehicle. He acknowledged that the only
reason he pulled Pargament over was because of the distance
between his vehicle and the vehicle that pulled over in front
of him. It was not a situation in which Pargament was
traveling too fast and ran up on the back of the other
vehicle. Rather, the only reason Pargament was following too
closely was because the white vehicle had pulled in front of
him. He said the white vehicle signaled before pulling into
the right lane in front of Pargament-leaving what looked like
one car length between the two vehicles. He said the white
vehicle accelerated and pulled ahead slightly as he (Elmore)
pulled behind Pargament's vehicle. He acknowledged the
possibility that if he had stayed in the left lane for
another ten seconds, the white vehicle would have continued
to accelerate, thereby opening the distance between Pargament
and the white vehicle. Trooper Elmore's dashcam video
from that night was also introduced. It established that the
"little bit" of time Elmore followed Pargament
before activating his lights was about thirty seconds.
The
trial court ruled that Elmore had probable cause to stop
Pargament because his vehicle was traveling too closely to
the white vehicle. Pargament contends that there was no
probable cause for the stop and that because the stop was
unconstitutional, the evidence seized as a result of the stop
(marijuana) should have been suppressed because it was fruit
of the poisonous tree.[1]
Arkansas
Code Annotated section 27-51-305 (Supp. 2017) provides that
the "driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another
vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having
regard for the speed of vehicles and the traffic upon and the
condition of the highway." A police officer may stop and
detain a motorist when the officer has probable cause to
believe that a traffic offense has occurred. Cagle v.
State, 2019 Ark.App. 69, ___ S.W.3d ___ . Probable cause
exists when the facts and circumstances within an
officer's knowledge are sufficient to permit a person of
reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person suspected. Id. In assessing
the existence of probable cause, our review is liberal rather
than strict. Id. The relevant inquiry is whether the
officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant was
committing a traffic offense at the time of the initial stop,
not whether the driver was actually guilty of a traffic
offense. Id.
In
reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress
evidence, we conduct a de novo review based on the totality
of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical facts
for clear error and determining whether those facts give rise
to reasonable suspicion or probable cause, giving due weight
to the inferences drawn by the trial court. Id. A
finding is clearly erroneous when, even if there is evidence
to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the
entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. We
defer to the trial court's superior position in
determining the credibility of the witnesses and resolving
any conflicts in the testimony. Id.
Here,
Trooper Elmore testified that the only reason Pargament was
following too closely was because the other vehicle had
pulled in front of him. He further acknowledged that it was
not a situation in which Pargament was traveling too fast and
ran up on the back of the other vehicle and that Pargament
was not traveling considerably above or below the
seventy-mile-an-hour speed limit.
Elmore's
testimony and the dashcam video of the events leading to the
stop do not differ in any significant degree. The video makes
it clear that the "little bit" Elmore followed
Pargament before turning on his lights was about thirty
seconds. Elmore acknowledged in his testimony that the white
vehicle had accelerated and pulled ahead slightly as Elmore
changed lanes and got behind Pargament's vehicle. He
further acknowledged the possibility that if he had waited
another ten seconds before stopping Pargament, the
acceleration of the white vehicle would have opened the
distance between it and Pargament's vehicle.
Our de
novo review of the totality of the circumstances convinces us
that the trial court clearly erred in finding Elmore had
probable cause to stop Pargament. Even employing a liberal
review of the evidence, we have determined that the facts and
circumstances within Elmore's knowledge were not
sufficient to permit a person of reasonable caution to
believe Pargament had committed the traffic offense of
following too closely to the vehicle that pulled in front of
him. Instead, the "fault" in this situation lay
more with the driver who pulled into Pargament's lane,
and Elmore did not allow enough time (thirty seconds) for
Pargament to correct the situation that he admittedly did not
cause. In summation, we are left with a definite and firm
...