United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Hot Springs Division
ORDER
SUSAN
O. HICKEY CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before
the Court is Defendant Joseph Ernest Bradshaw's Rule
12(b) Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 7). Plaintiffs Richard
Biddle and Nora Biddle filed a response. (ECF No. 14).
Defendant filed a reply. (ECF No. 15). Plaintiffs filed a
sur-reply. (ECF No. 18). The Court finds the matter ripe for
consideration.[1]
I.
BACKGROUND
This
case concerns an automobile collision. Plaintiffs are
citizens of Arkansas who reside in Garland County. Defendant,
a citizen and resident of Texas, is a self-employed
tractor-trailer driver who, for the last eight years, has
regularly transported wood chips for Ward Timber, a
Texas-based customer. Defendant drives the wood chips
fourteen miles from Jefferson, Texas to a mill in Ashdown,
Arkansas. On March 11, 2018, Plaintiffs and Defendant, who
were each driving their respective personal vehicles, were
involved in a collision on Highway 59, in Marion County,
Texas. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant negligently caused
the collision, which resulted in personal injury and property
damage.
On
December 18, 2018, Plaintiffs filed suit in the Circuit Court
of Garland County, Arkansas. On January 14, 2019, Defendant
answered Plaintiff's complaint and filed the instant
motion to dismiss. On January 15, 2019, Defendant removed the
case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441,
asserting that the Court has original jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because complete diversity exists
between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds
$75, 000.
On
February 7, 2019, Defendant refiled the instant motion to
dismiss with a new, introductory passage, noting that the
motion had been filed and was pending in state court prior to
removal.[2] Defendant moves for dismissal based on
lack of personal jurisdiction and improper
venue.[3] Plaintiffs oppose the motion.
II.
DISCUSSION
Defendant
moves for dismissal on two grounds: lack of personal
jurisdiction and improper venue. The Court will first address
Defendant's venue argument and, if necessary, will then
proceed to the personal jurisdiction argument.
A.
Venue
Citing
Arkansas state caselaw, Defendant argues that venue is
improper because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
him, and failure to satisfy the requirements for personal
jurisdiction also amounts to failure to establish venue.
Other than one paragraph in the instant motion, (ECF No. 7,
p. 3), this venue argument is not discussed or even
acknowledged in the parties' subsequent briefing
papers.[4] Despite Defendant's framing of his
venue argument as being necessarily dependent on a personal
jurisdiction determination, for the reasons discussed below,
it is unnecessary for the Court to first make a finding on
personal jurisdiction to resolve the venue issue.
Venue
is “the place where the power to adjudicate is to be
exercised, the place where the suit may be or should be
heard.” Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carl J.
Austad & Sons, Inc., 343 F.2d 7, 11 (8th Cir. 1965).
“Venue requirements exist for the benefit of
defendants.” Richards v. Aramark Servs., Inc.,
108 F.3d 925, 928 (8th Cir. 1997). “One of the central
purposes of statutory venue is to ensure that a defendant is
not haled into a remote district, having no real relationship
to the dispute.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
A party
may move to dismiss an action that is not filed in the proper
venue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3). When reviewing a motion under
Rule 12(b)(3), the Court applies the same standard used for
other motions to dismiss. Twin Lakes Sales, LLC v.
Hunter's Specialties, Inc., 2005 WL 1593361, at *1
(D. Minn. July 6, 2005). To that end, the Court must construe
all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
and take as true all well-pled facts alleged in the complaint
that are not controverted by the movant's affidavits or
evidence.[5] Dobson Bros. Constr. Co. v. Arr-Maz
Prod., L.P., No. 4:12-cv-3118, 2013 WL 12141246, at *2
(D. Neb. May 7, 2013).
“Where
no special venue statute is applicable, the general venue
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, applies.” Catholic
Order of Foresters v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc.,
337 F.Supp.2d 1148, 1154 (N.D. Iowa 2004). However, the
general venue statute does not apply to cases that have been
removed from state to federal court. Polizzi v. Cowles
Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 665 (1953). Venue of a
removed case is governed solely by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a),
which provides that the proper venue of a removed case is
“the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such action
is pending.” Id. “[I]t is immaterial
that the federal court to which the action is removed would
not have been in a district of proper venue if the action had
been brought there originally.”[6] Schuler v. SunOpta Food
Grp. LLC, No. CIV 3:07-CV-101, 2008 WL 4416447, at *2
(D.N.D. Sept. 24, 2008) (citing Charles Alan Wright et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3726, at
119-20 (3d ed. 1998)).
It is
undisputed that this case was initially brought in the
Garland County Circuit Court. The Western District of
Arkansas, Hot Springs Division, is the federal judicial
district and division embracing Garland County, Arkansas. 28
U.S.C. § 83(b)(6). Thus, even assuming arguendo
that pre-removal venue was improper in the Garland County
Circuit Court as Defendant contended, venue is now proper in
this Court pursuant to section 1441(a) because Defendant
removed the case to the federal judicial district and
division embracing the place where the case was previously
pending. Shaffer v. Rees Masilionis Turley Architecture,
LLC, No. 4:14-cv-965 CEJ, 2014 WL 5320266, at *1 (E.D.
Mo. Oct. 17, 2014) (“The fact that venue may have been
improper in the state court prior to removal is of no
import.”); see also 28 U.S.C § 1441(f)
(abrogating the theory of derivative jurisdiction and
stating, “[t]he court to which a civil action is
removed . . . is not precluded from hearing and determining
any claim . . . because the State court from which such civil
action is removed did not have jurisdiction over that
claim”); Hollis v. Fla. State Univ., 259 F.3d
1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that, “as a matter
of law, § 1441(a) establishes federal venue in the
district where the state action was pending, and it is
immaterial that venue was improper under state law when the
action was originally filed”).
Accordingly,
the Court finds that venue is proper in the Western District
of Arkansas, Hot Springs Division, and that dismissal is not
warranted on venue grounds. With the issue of venue now
resolved, the ...