United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Jonesboro Division
ORDER
James
M. Moody Jr. United States District Judge
Defendant
have filed a motion for summary judgment of all
Plaintiff's FLSA and AMWA claims. Defendants contend that
Plaintiff has failed to establish (1) that the Defendants had
actual or constructive knowledge of Plaintiff's alleged
uncompensated work time as an hourly employee; (2) that
Plaintiff was exempt from overtime pay while she was an
Assistant Manager because she was employed in a bona fide
executive, administrative or professional capacity; and (3)
that Plaintiff is unable to meet her burden of proof as to
her AMWA class claim. In response, Plaintiff states that she
has not requested certification of the AMWA class claims and
she concedes that the conditionally certified Section 216
class should be decertified. As for her FLSA claims,
Plaintiff contends that she has raised issues of material
fact from which a reasonable jury could determine that the
Defendants knew she was working hours in excess of those she
reported, and she contends that the Defendants have failed to
produce actual evidence for each prong of the executive
exemption analysis.
I.
Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary
judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue
of material fact, so that the dispute may be decided solely
on legal grounds. Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874
(8th Cir. 1987); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The Supreme Court has
established guidelines to assist trial courts in determining
whether this standard has been met:
The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining
whether there is a need for trial -- whether, in other words,
there are genuine factual issues that properly can be
resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably
be resolved in favor of either party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
(1986).
The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned that summary
judgment should be invoked carefully so that no person will
be improperly deprived of a trial of disputed factual issues.
Inland Oil & Transport Co. v. United States, 600
F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991
(1979). The Eighth Circuit set out the burden of the parties
in connection with a summary judgment motion in Counts v.
M.K. Ferguson Co., 862 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir. 1988):
[T]he burden on the moving party for summary judgment is only
to demonstrate, i.e., D[to] point out to the
District Court, D that the record does not disclose a genuine
dispute on a material fact. It is enough for the movant to
bring up the fact that the record does not contain such an
issue and to identify that part of the record which bears out
his assertion. Once this is done, his burden is discharged,
and, if the record in fact bears out the claim that no
genuine dispute exists on any material fact, it is then the
respondents burden to set forth affirmative evidence,
specific facts, showing that there is a genuine dispute on
that issue. If the respondent fails to carry that burden,
summary judgment should be granted.
Id. at 1339. (quoting City of Mt. Pleasant v.
Associated Elec. Coop., 838 F.2d 268, 273-274 (8th Cir.
1988) (citations omitted) (brackets in original)). Only
disputes over facts that may affect the outcome of the suit
under governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
II.
Analysis
“An
employee can prevail on a FLSA overtime compensation claim if
he can show that he worked hours for which he was not paid,
and the employer knew or should have known that he was
working overtime.” Blevins v. City of
Plainview, 2013 WL 12136539, at *4 (E.D.Ark. Sept. 16,
2013) (citing Hertz v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 566
F.3d 775, 781 (8th Cir. 2009)). Whether an employer had
actual or constructive knowledge that its employee was
working uncompensated overtime is a jury question.
Id.
Defendants
had a practice of requiring employees to estimate their
clock-out time for closing shifts and, if there was any
discrepancy in the estimate, the employee was required to
take some action to fix it later. Plaintiff testified that
she often misestimated the time it would take her to finish
her closing duties and there was no specific procedure in
place to correct her time. Further, Plaintiff stated that, on
multiple occasions, she requested a correction of her time
and Defendants failed to correct her paycheck. Based upon the
evidence in the record, the Court finds that there is a
question of fact as to whether the Defendants had knowledge
or should have had knowledge that Plaintiff was working hours
for which she was not compensated. Defendants' motion for
summary judgment is denied on Plaintiff's FLSA overtime
claim.
Defendants
contend that Plaintiff was exempt from overtime pay while she
was working as an Assistant Manager because she was in a
position of management. Minimum wage and overtime
requirements do not apply to “any employee employed in
a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional
capacity . . . except that an employee of a retail or service
establishment shall not be excluded from the definition of
employee employed in a bona fide executive or administrative
capacity because of the number of hours in his workweek which
he devotes to activities not directly or closely related to
the performance of executive or administrative activities, if
less than 40 per centum of his hours worked in the workweek
are devoted to such activities.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 213
(a)(1). Generally, “the application of an exemption
under the Fair Labor Standards Act is a matter of affirmative
defense on which the employer has the burden of proof.”
Hertz, 566 F.3d at 783 (quoting Corning Glass
Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97, (1974)).
“Disputes regarding the nature of an employee's
duties are questions of fact, but the ultimate question
whether an employee is exempt under the FLSA is an issue of
law.” Jarrett v. ERC Properties, Inc., 211
F.3d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Icicle Seafoods,
Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714 (1986)).
Under
Department of Labor regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a),
the term ‘employee employed in a bona fide ...