United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Texarkana Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION
HON.
BARRY A. BRYANT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Johnny
Adams (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant
to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social Security Act
(“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010),
seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) partially denying his applications for a
period of disability, Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Act.
The
Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate
judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case,
including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final
judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF
No. 5.[1] Pursuant to this authority, the Court
issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a
final judgment in this matter.
1.
Background:
Plaintiff
protectively filed his DIB application on April 27, 2016 and
his SSI application on August 14, 2015. (Tr. 19). In his
applications, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to a blood
disorder, sleep apnea, COPD, blackouts, dizziness, numbness
in his hands and feet, possible gout, swelling in his feet,
and nerve problems. (Tr. 260). Plaintiff alleges an onset
date of September 24, 2013. (Tr. 19). These applications were
denied initially and again upon reconsideration. Id.
Plaintiff
requested an administrative hearing on his denied
applications. (Tr. 184-186). This hearing request was
granted, and Plaintiff's administrative hearing was held
on January 23, 2018 in Shreveport, Louisiana. (Tr. 57-76). At
this hearing, Plaintiff was present and was represented by
counsel, Greg Giles. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational
Expert (“VE”) James Wallace testified at this
hearing. Id.
After
this hearing, the ALJ entered a partially favorable decision
on his disability applications. (Tr. 12-31). In this
decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured status
requirements of the Act through December 31, 2015. (Tr. 22,
Finding 1). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had not engage in
Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since his
alleged onset date. (Tr. 22, Finding 2). The ALJ determined
Plaintiff had at least a high school education and was able
to communicate in English. (Tr. 27, Finding 8). The ALJ also
determined that, prior to his established disability date,
Plaintiff was a “younger individual” as defined
by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563(c) and 416.963(c). (Tr.
27, Finding 7).
The ALJ
determined that, since his alleged disability date of
September 24, 2013, Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: COPD, obstructive sleep apnea, hypertension,
status-post congestive heart failure, polycythemia, syncope,
and obesity. (Tr. 22, Finding 3). The ALJ then evaluated
Plaintiff's impairments prior to January 1, 2016
and after January 1, 2016. Prior to January 1, 2016,
the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one
of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. (Tr. 22-23, Finding 4). The ALJ determined that
prior to January 1, 2016, Plaintiff retained the
following RFC:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the
undersigned finds that prior to January 1, 2016, the date the
claimant became disabled, the claimant had the residual
functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20
CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except frequent climbing of
stairs and ramps, balancing, kneeling, stooping, crouching,
and crawling but no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.
The claimant can have no exposure to high concentrations of
fumes and other pulmonary irritants, and he can have no
exposure to unprotected heights or dangerous moving
machinery.
Id.
The ALJ
determined that since September 24, 2013, Plaintiff was
unable to perform any of his Past Relevant Work
(“PRW”). (Tr. 27, Finding 6). However, the ALJ
also determined that prior to January 1, 2016, Plaintiff
retained the capacity to perform other work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 27-28,
Finding 10). Accordingly, the ALJ found that, prior to
January 1, 2016, Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 30, Finding
12). As of January 1, 2016, the ALJ found Plaintiff's
impairments met the requirements of Listing 3.02 and was
disabled. (Tr. 28-30, Finding 11). Plaintiff's insured
status expired the day before, on December 31, 2015. (Tr. 30,
Finding 13).
Plaintiff
sought review with the Appeals Council. On July 24, 2018, the
Appeals Council denied this request for review. (Tr. 1-6). On
August 21, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this matter.
ECF No. 1. Both Parties have filed appeal briefs and have
consented to the jurisdiction of this Court. ECF Nos. 5,
13-14. This case is now ready for determination.
2.
Applicable Law:
In
reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine
whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart,292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is
less than a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough
that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the
Commissioner's decision. See Johnson v. Apfel,240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). As long as there is
substantial evidence in the record that supports the
Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it
simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that
would have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court
would have decided the case differently. See Haley v.
Massanari,258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after
reviewing the record, it is possible to ...