United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Fayetteville Division
OPINION AND ORDER
HOLMES, III, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
a civil rights action filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1983. Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma
pauperis. Plaintiff is incarcerated in the Washington
County Detention Center (“WCDC”).
case is currently before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss
(ECF NO. 14) filed on behalf of Sheriff Tim Helder, Corporal
Tom Mulvaney, and Sergeant J. Byrd. Plaintiff has responded
(ECF No. 20). The Motion is ready for decision.
to the allegations of the Complaint (ECF No. 1) and
Supplement (ECF No. 10), on March 11, 2019, a
“brawl” or riot broke out in Q-pod. More than 10
individuals were involved in the brawl and it continued
uninterrupted for approximately 22 minutes. During the brawl,
two ethnic groups were chasing each other around
“stab[b]ing and striking” each other.
alleges he ran from one end of the pod to another in an
effort to avoid those fighting. After the “fight
finally played out, ” Deputy Justin Edens came into the
pod and saw the blood on various inmates and called to Q-pod
control, Deputy Joseph Malone, to review the footage. Despite
the use of weapons by the inmates, no weapons were mentioned
in any of the reports resulting from the incident.
alleges that “Sheriff Tim Helder and his underling
subordinate deputies failed to do what the County and our tax
paying doll[a]rs pay them to do, which is provide us a safe
environment and security.” Plaintiff notes that two of
the individuals involved in the brawl were put back in Q-pod
a few days later. Finally, Plaintiff notes that Sheriff
Helder is charged with hiring responsible deputies who will
do their jobs but has failed to do so.
second claim is that Sergeant Pineda, Sergeant Byrd, and
Corporal Mulvaney have: engaged in evasive tactics on the
requests he has written; not allowed him to exhaust the
grievance process; and, refuse to provide him with grievance
the March 11 incident, Plaintiff states he has been suffering
from “severe mental issues.” When people walk up
next to him, Plaintiff believes he is going to be attacked.
He also states he has “pictures in his head, ”
severe anxiety, sleeplessness, and social anxiety when he is
in front of ethnic groups.
8(a) contains the general pleading rules and requires a
complaint to present “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “In order to meet
this standard and survive a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), ‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Braden v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotations omitted)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. While the Court will
liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's
complaint, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to
support his claims. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d
912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).
Response (ECF No. 20) to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff
indicates he has no objection to dismissing claim two and
Defendants Corporal Mulvaney and Sergeant Byrd. Accordingly,
the only issue before the Court for decision is whether
Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim against Sheriff
liability under § 1983 must be based on personal
involvement. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
“Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link
to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.
To establish personal liability of the supervisory defendant,
[Plaintiff] must allege specific facts of personal
involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation
of his constitutional rights.” Clemmons v.
Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132
(8th Cir. 2006)). A defendant in a § 1983 suit cannot be
held vicariously liable for the acts of another. Parrish
v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010). In other
words, Sheriff Helder may not be held liable solely on the
basis of conduct of one or more of his