United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Fayetteville Division
OPINION AND ORDER
TIMOTHY L. BROOKS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Defendant
Cobb-Vantress, Inc. filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings (Doc. 34) as to two claims in Plaintiff Martha
Cea's Second Amended Complaint. The Court notified the
parties in a text-only Order issued on July 22, 2019 (Doc.
42) that the motion would be converted to one for summary
judgment under Rule 56. Further, the Court advised the
parties in that same text-only Order that they were welcome
to submit any supplementary briefing, documents, or other
materials in support of or in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment by no later than August 2, 2019. The parties
submitted their supplementary briefs and materials by the
deadline. Then, on August 5, Defendant requested leave to
file a document that Cea referred to in her supplementary
brief but did not attach. The Court granted Defendant leave
to file the document, and at that point, the motion became
fully ripe. After considering all the arguments and evidence
submitted by the parties, the motion is
GRANTED for the reasons set forth below.
I.
BACKGROUND
Defendant's
motion for summary judgment requests dismissal of two claims
that appear in the Second Amended Complaint: a claim for
overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act
("AMWA") and a claim for disability discrimination
and retaliation under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act
("ACRA"). With respect to the overtime claim, Cea
agrees it is subject to dismissal and explains that its
inclusion in the Second Amended Complaint, see Doc.
32 at ¶¶30, 52, was the result of a
"scrivener's error." (Doc. 36 at 1). The Court
issued a prior Order that detailed the reasons why Cea's
overtime claims under both statutes were subject to
dismissal. See Doc. 28. Accordingly, since the
claims for overtime compensation under the FLSA and/or AMWA
were included in the motion for summary judgment, and Cea
offered no further argument or evidence as to why they should
be preserved, they are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE under Rule 56.[1]
The
second issue addressed in Defendant's summary judgment
motion is Cea's claim of disability discrimination and
retaliation, made pursuant to the ACRA. Defendant offers an
affirmative defense that this claim was untimely filed and
should be dismissed with prejudice. The Court notes that Cea
filed her original complaint (Doc. 3) in the Circuit Court of
Benton County, Arkansas, on November 26, 2018. The case was
removed to this Court on February 7, 2019 (Doc. 1).
Thereafter, Cea filed her first amended complaint (Doc. 14)
on March 19, 2019. Neither the original complaint nor the
first amended complaint asserted any disability-related
claims. The first time such a claim was raised was in
Cea's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 32), filed on June
18, 2019. Count V of that most recent pleading contends that
"Defendants violated the ACRA by discriminating against
Plaintiff on the basis of her disability" by ignoring
certain temporary restrictions on her ability to lift and
bend, which her doctor imposed following a surgical
procedure, and by increasing her workload. Id. at
¶¶ 10-16, 62. Cea further contends that she
"suffered retaliation after she complained about the
violations of her doctor's work restrictions" and
was terminated "after she complained of the increased
workload." Id. at ¶ 63.
Defendant
does not confront the substance of Cea's
disability-related claim or otherwise argue that it should be
dismissed on the merits.[2] Instead, Defendant confines its
argument to the statute of limitations relevant to the
disability claim. Defendant maintains that the claim carries
with it a statute of limitations of either one year after the
alleged employment discrimination occurred or within ninety
days of Cea's receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
concerning the claim, whichever date is later. The latest
date that Cea allegedly suffered discrimination was June 21,
2017, her termination date. And the earliest date the
disability-related claim was pleaded in this case was June
18, 2019, nearly two years later.[3] As for the right-to-sue
letter, Defendant argues that Cea never made a disability
claim before the EEOC, so she never exhausted the claim
administratively, and the ninety-day limitations period
measured from the date of the right-to-sue letter does not
apply.
Upon
consideration of Defendant's statute of limitations
argument, the Court found that it was capable of final
resolution under Rule 56 without the need for further
discovery. Cea's initial response to the motion assured
the Court that she received a right-to-sue letter concerning
her disability claim and filed her lawsuit within ninety days
of receiving the letter. (Doc. 36 at 4). However, Cea failed
to reveal when she received the right-to-sue letter, and she
neglected to attach the letter to her response. Accordingly,
the Court entered a text-only Order (Doc. 41) on July 16,
2019, directing Cea to file "the right-to-sue letter she
received from the EEOC with respect to her disability claims
by no later than July 23, 2019," in the hope of
resolving the statute of limitations issue immediately. On
July 22, Cea filed a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, dated
August 28, 2018. See Doc. 38-1.
The day
Cea filed the right-to-sue letter, Defendant filed a motion
(Doc. 39) requesting leave to provide further documentation
to the Court. Specifically, Defendant argued that although
Cea produced a right-to-sue letter, this letter did not
pertain to any EEOC investigation of disability
discrimination or retaliation claims. Instead, Cea's
complaint before the EEOC only concerned claims for
race/color/national origin discrimination. To prove this
point, Defendant submitted "EEOC Form 5" to the
Court, which details the specific charge of discrimination
that Cea asked the EEOC to investigate. Cea signed Form 5
(Doc. 43 at 5) on October 4, 2017, and only checked the boxes
for "race," "color," and
"retaliation" discrimination.[4] The
"disabilty" box was left unchecked. Further, in the
narrative section of Form 5, Cea never mentioned that she
suffered from a disability or was discriminated against due
to a disability. The narrative portion stated in full:
I was hired on or about January 8, 1998 in Processing. My job
was to vaccinate and grade thousands of baby chicks on a
conveyor belt. I also sent orders to Tyson Foods. I was
required to stay after my shift ended to clean the factory.
From around March 2017 until June 2017, 1 was required to
cover three stations which was not physically possible. On
June 21, 2017, 1 complained and then I was written up and
discharged.
I was told I was terminated for allegedly disrespecting the
lead.
I believe that I was discharged because of my national
origin, El Salvador, in violation of Title VII of the civil
rights Act of 1964, as amended. I also believe that Hispanic
employees as a class are denied promotions and disciplined
more harshly than non-Hispanic employees, in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Id.
Despite
what she wrote on Form 5, Cea persists in arguing that
"the EEOC's investigation could have
reasonably encompassed disability discrimination." (Doc.
45 at 4 (emphasis added)). Cea points out that the facts
surrounding her disability claim took place at around the
same time as the race/national origin discrimination claims
she explicitly cited on Form 5. She also quotes from Form 5
to make the observation that she told the EEOC it was not
"physically possible" for her to cover three work
stations at once, and this fact put the EEOC on notice,
essentially, that she was asserting a disability claim.
Finally, she reminds the Court that the Defendant bears the
burden of proof on summary judgment and notes that Defendant
"has failed to produce any evidence that Cea did
not provide facts to the EEOC related to disability
discrimination." Id. In fact, Cea suggests that
since this other evidence may exist, the Court should not be
in a hurry to decide the statute of limitations issue just
yet, but should instead give Cea the benefit of the doubt
that "'supporting documentation' beyond the
'four corners' of the Charge, including the Intake
Questionnaire and attached statement" exist and
could establish that the EEOC did, in fact, consider
her disability claim when investigating her other complaints.
Id. at 5 (citation omitted).
Of
course, the content of the documents supporting the EEOC
charge-including the Intake Questionnaire-should have been
known to Cea at the time she filed this case, so the Court
was initially confused as to why she did not simply attach
these documents instead of resorting to innuendo.
Fortunately, Defendant filed Cea's EEOC Intake
Questionnaire on the docket (Doc. 48). The Questionnaire
explicitly lists only claims for race and national origin
discrimination, and not disability discrimination. (Doc. 48
at 2). One question in particular on the Questionnaire is:
"Do you have a Disabilty?" And Cea responded by
checking "No." Id. Finally, Cea's
narrative description on the Questionnaire never mentions any
facts concerning her alleged disability that now appear in
Count V of the Second Amended Complaint. The Questionnaire
never mentions Cea's surgery, sick leave, doctor's
note, or doctor-imposed lifting and bending restrictions.
Id. at 6. Although the Questionnaire does state that
on June 21, 2017, Cea's supervisor ordered her to do the
"impossible task" of ...