FROM THE ARKANSAS BOARD OF REVIEW [NO. 2018-BR-01119]
F. Campbell, P.A., by: Sheila F. Campbell, for appellant.
Cynthia Uhrynowycz, for appellee.
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, JUDGE
Jones appeals the Arkansas Board of Review's
("Board's") decision denying her claim for
unemployment benefits. On appeal, Jones argues that the Board
erred in finding that she was disqualified from receiving
benefits because (1) she voluntarily left her last work
without good cause and (2) she was not able and available for
suitable work. We affirm.
27, 2018, Jones filed an application for
unemployment-insurance benefits with the director of the
Department of Workforce Services ("Department").
She indicated that she had last worked for Atrium Hospitality
LP ("Atrium") and that her employment had ended on
March 11. She further stated that her separation from
employment was for medical leave and that she has
disabilities that limited her ability to perform her job
on June 27, Jones completed an "Able and
Available-Claimant Statement" and responded that she was
not able and available for work from March 9, and she left
the ending date open. She further marked that she was
"[s]till not able and available for work."
6, Atrium responded that Jones had been on medical leave
through June 30 and that she was scheduled to return to work
on July 1. Atrium attached a June 25 letter from Cigna
Insurance ("Cigna") stating that Jones's
medical leave would expire on June 30 and that she had been
advised to return to work on the first working day following
On July 17, Jones completed a "Miscellaneous-Claimant
Statement." She wrote,
I didn't go back to work because I am still not able to
work. I was suppose[d] to return to work 7-1-18 but I
didn't. I didn't take anything from my employer
stating I still needed time off. I did file for workmans
[sic] comp but they denied it because they said there is no
proof that I was hurt [a]t work. I have filed a grievance
since they denied my worksman [sic] comp but I haven't
18, the Department found that Jones was disqualified from
benefits because (1) she had left Atrium without making
reasonable efforts to preserve her job rights and (2) she was
not able to perform suitable work due to a disabling physical
appealed the Department's decision to the Arkansas Appeal
Tribunal ("Tribunal"). She did not appear for the
August 14 hearing, and the Tribunal affirmed the
Department's decision. Jones requested a reopening of the
case, and the Tribunal conducted a reopening hearing on
September 13. At the hearing, Jones admitted that she had
received notice of the August 14 hearing date and time but
stated that she was stressed and "got mixed up with the
timing." The Tribunal denied Jones's request for
reopening because she did not have good cause for failing to
appear at the hearing. Jones appealed the Tribunal's
decision to the Board, and on October 30, the Board affirmed
and adopted the Tribunal's decision. This appeal
appeal of an unemployment-compensation case, we review the
evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in
the light most favorable to the Board's findings.
Coker v. Dir., 99 Ark.App. 455, 456, 262 S.W.3d 175,
176 (2007). The Board's findings of fact are conclusive
if supported by substantial evidence. Id.
Substantial evidence is evidence a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id.
However, that is not to say that our function on appeal is
merely to ratify whatever decision is made by the Board.
Boothe v. Dir., 59 Ark.App. 169, 954 S.W.2d 946
(1997). We will reverse the Board's decision when it is
not supported by substantial evidence. Id.
appeal, Jones first argues that the Board's finding that
she left work without good cause is not supported by
substantial evidence. She asserts that she requested an
extension of her medical leave from Cigna, the agency that
handles Atrium's medical leave, before she left her