Christopher S. HOLLOWAY, Appellant/Cross-Appellee
v.
Tori D. HOLLOWAY, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Page 174
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Page 175
APPEAL
FROM THE BENTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 04DR-16-2082],
HONORABLE SCOTT JACKSON, JUDGE
Cullen
& Co., PLLC, by: Tim Cullen, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Brian
G. Brooks, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brian G. Brooks, for
appellee/cross-appellant.
OPINION
WAYMOND
M. BROWN, Judge
In
this divorce action, Christopher S. Holloway (who is known as
Shawn and will be referred to as such herein) appeals the
order of the Benton County Circuit Court. He asserts that the
court erred by "imposing an unreasonable financial
burden on [him] by awarding retroactive and current support
without any finding establishing [his] income, without the
mandatory reference to the child support chart, and without
considering applicable factors supporting a downward
deviation." Shawn also challenges the division of the
parties property. Tori D. Holloway (Tori) cross-appeals
arguing (1) equal division of the marital home was erroneous,
and (2) the award of additional visitation beyond what was
exercised during the parties long separation was not in the
childrens best interest. We affirm the circuit courts
order.
Shawn
and Tori were married on June 1, 2001, and filed for divorce
in December 2016. The divorce decree entered on March 12,
2018, distributed the marital assets, debts, and property
between the parties, and also established the custody,
visitation, and child-support obligations of the parties with
regard to the four children born of the marriage.
Following
the entry of the divorce decree, Shawn filed a motion for
reconsideration urging the court to reconsider the
child-support award due to the totality of the financial
burden placed on him as a result of having to pay current and
retroactive child support, half of the childrens
private-school tuition, and also contribute toward their
extracurricular activities and medical expenses. In response,
Tori urged the circuit court to deny the motion stating that
Shawn had "not complied with any recognized procedure to
alter the decree" as required under Rule 59 or Rule 60
of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. Shawn replied,
alleging that the child-support award was excessive and,
although not explicitly stated, his motion for
reconsideration should be considered a motion for a new trial
under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 59.
Page 176
Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 59(b) provides
A motion for a new trial shall be filed not later than 10
days after the entry of judgment. A motion made after entry
of judgment shall become effective and be treated as filed on
the day after the judgment is entered. If the court neither
grants nor denies the motion within 30 days of the date on
which it is filed or treated as filed, it shall be deemed
denied as of the 30th day.
Here,
the motion was filed on March 23 and was deemed denied thirty
days later on April 24.[1] Shawn filed his notice of appeal on
April 9, which was prior to the deemed denial of his
postjudgment motion. While a notice of appeal filed before
disposition of any motion to alter, amend, or set aside a
judgment shall be treated as filed on the day after entry of
an order disposing of the last motion outstanding or the day
after the motion is deemed denied by operation of law, such a
notice is only effective to appeal the underlying judgment,
decree, or order, not the postjudgment motion.[2] Shawns
...