United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Fayetteville Division
OPINION AND ORDER
HOLMES, III U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Manson (“Manson”), currently an inmate of the
Benton County Detention Center (“BCDC”), has
filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He
proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis
case is before the Court for preservice screening under the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court has the
obligation to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of
a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A).
to the allegations of the Complaint (ECF No. 3), on the
morning of March 5, 2019, Deputy Otts was picking up bedding.
Manson alleges he showed Deputy Otts the blood and urine all
over his jumper and asked if Deputy Otts could “get
medical for” him. Manson alleges that Deputy Otts said
he would but did not. That same morning, Manson showed Deputy
Roles that he had started urinating blood and asked Deputy
Roles to notify medical immediately. Manson alleges that
despite his request, he spent from 5:00 a.m. until lunch time
in a urine and blood-stained jumper.
the IFP statute, the Court is obligated to screen the case
prior to service of process being issued. The Court must
dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains
claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious; (2) fail to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted; or, (3) seek
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii).
is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in
law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro
se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a
claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”
Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)(quotations and citation
omitted). To state a claim, Manson must demonstrate (1) that
he suffered from objectively serious medical needs and (2)
that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately
disregarded those needs. McRaven v. Sanders, 577
F.3d 974, 982 (8th Cir. 2009).
he suffered from an objectively serious medical need, Manson
must show he “has been diagnosed by a physician as
requiring treatment” or has an injury “that is so
obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Schaub
v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 914 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
establish the subjective prong of deliberate indifference,
“the prisoner must show more than negligence, more even
than gross negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment
decisions does not give rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. Deliberate indifference is akin to criminal
recklessness, which demands more than negligent
misconduct.” Popoalii v. Correctional Med.
Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 499 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotations
and citations omitted). This is an “onerous standard,
” Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742, 747 (8th
Cir. 2013), requiring a prisoner to “clear a
substantial evidentiary threshold.” Nelson v.
Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439, 449 (8th Cir. 2010). To
establish the subjective prong, a plaintiff must show that an
official “actually knew of but deliberately disregarded
his serious medical need.” Gordon v. Frank,
454 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir. 2006).
indifference may be manifested by “prison guards in
intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or
intentionally interfering with the treatment once
prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at
104–05. However, the “Constitution does not
require jailers to handle every medical complaint as quickly
as each inmate might wish.” Jenkins v. County of
Hennepin, Minn., 557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009).
does not allege that his medical situation involved an acute
or escalating situation such that a delay of at most a half
of a day would be detrimental to his medical prognosis.
Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 342 (8th Cir. 2011)
(citations omitted). Manson does not allege he needed
emergency medical care or that his injuries were so severe it
was obvious he needed to be seen immediately. Instead, he
only alleges that these two deputies ...