United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Western Division
WILLIAM F. DOSHIER and DOTSTRATEGY, CO. PLAINTIFFS
TWITTER, INC. DEFENDANT
Kristine G. Baker United States District Judge
the Court is a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(3), or, alternatively, to transfer venue
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) filed by defendant Twitter,
Inc. (“Twitter”) (Dkt. No. 3). Plaintiffs William
F. Doshier and dotStrategy, Co. (“dotStrategy”)
responded in opposition to the motion (Dkt. No. 5). Twitter
filed a reply in further support of its motion (Dkt. No. 11).
Plaintiffs filed a surreply (Dkt. No. 18). For the following
reasons, in the interest of justice, the Court grants the
motion to transfer venue (Dkt. No. 3).
filed their complaint initially in the Circuit Court of
Faulkner County, Arkansas (Dkt. No. 2). Twitter removed this
action to this Court on September 21, 2018 (Dkt. No. 1).
Twitter then filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) or, alternatively, to transfer venue
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Dkt. No. 3). Plaintiffs
oppose the motion. Twitter asserts that venue is improper in
this Court and that the Court should either dismiss this case
or transfer it to the Northern District of California
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Plaintiffs requested
limited jurisdictional discovery regarding venue, but this
Court by separate Order denied that request (Dkt. Nos. 15,
26). For the following reasons, the Court determines that
this case should be transferred to the Northern District of
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) permits a party to raise the
defense of improper venue by motion. In considering a motion
to dismiss, the pleadings are construed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, and the facts alleged in
the complaint must be taken as true. Ambiguities must be
resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. See Dakota
Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384,
1387 (8th Cir. 1991). The moving party has the burden of
establishing that venue is improper. United States v.
Orshek, 164 F.2d 741, 742 (8th Cir. 1947).
of all civil actions brought in district courts of the United
States” is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which
action may be brought in-
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if
all defendants are residents of the State in which the
district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the subject of the
action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise
be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district
in which any defendant is subject to the court’s
personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
is proper in any judicial district in which any defendant is
subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with
respect to such action only if there is no district in which
an action may otherwise be brought as provided in §
1391. This means that the Court must determine whether venue
is appropriate under subsections (1) and (2) of §
1391(b) before looking to subsection (3) to determine if
venue is proper. Further, where there are multiple claims
involved, unless the doctrine of “pendent venue”
applies, venue must be proper as to each claim. See
Bredberg v. Long, 778 F.2d 1285, 1288 (8th Cir. 1985);
Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 528
(8th Cir. 1973).
respect to § 1391(b)(1), the venue statute provides that
a “natural person . . . [is] deemed to reside in the
judicial district in which that person is domiciled, ”
and “an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued . .
. [is] deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial
district in which such defendant is subject to the
court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil
action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2).
The court looks to the time the claim arose to ...