FROM THE COLUMBIA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 14CR-16-7],
HONORABLE DAVID W. TALLEY, JR., JUDGE
W. Best, for appellant.
Rutledge, Atty Gen., by: Adam Jackson, Asst Atty Gen., for
Columbia County jury convicted appellant Craytonia Badger of
third-degree escape, first-degree criminal mischief, and
breaking or entering. He was sentenced as a habitual offender
to an aggregate term of sixty years imprisonment. Badger
argues that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion
to dismiss for violation of the speedy-trial rules, (2)
denying his motion to suppress a custodial statement, and (3)
denying his directed-verdict motion as to his first-degree
criminal-mischief conviction. We affirm as modified.
Although it is his third point on appeal, we address Badgers
sufficiency argument first because of double-jeopardy
concerns. Raheem v. State, 2018 Ark.App. 620, 566
S.W.3d 148. A motion for directed verdict is a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence. Davis v. State,
2009 Ark.App. 753, 2009 WL 3762749. On appeal, in reviewing a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to
determine whether the verdict is supported by substantial
evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Substantial
evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character
that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion
one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or
conjecture. Id. Decisions regarding the credibility
of witnesses are for the trier of fact. Id.
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only as it
pertains to his first-degree criminal-mischief conviction. A
person commits the offense of criminal mischief in the first
degree if he or she purposely and without legal justification
destroys or causes damage to any property of another. Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-38-203(a)(1) (Repl. 2013). The offense is a
Class D felony if the amount of actual damage is more than
$1,000 but $5,000 or less. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-38-203(b)(2).
Considering only the evidence that supports the verdict,
Badger was an inmate at the Columbia County detention
facility when he escaped on the night of December 6 or the
early morning of December 7, 2015. The testimony established
that Badger had been the only inmate in pod 5C. There was
testimony that a dismantled speaker and various tools found
in pod 5C had been used to create a hole through the ceiling
of the cell and the roof of the building. An invoice from a
sheet-metal company showed that the facility had been billed
$2,474.21 on December 22, 2015, for "labor and material
to repair hole cut in roof and repaired roof leaks."
Captain Mike McWilliams testified that the Columbia County
Sheriffs Department paid the bill and that he was not aware
of any other holes in the roof needing repair in December
argues on appeal that there was no substantial evidence that
he committed criminal mischief because McWilliams had no
personal knowledge of the repairs, he did not create the
invoice, and he did not pay the invoice himself. Badger
contends that McWilliams should not have been permitted to
testify that he (Badger) was 100 percent at fault for the
damage and subsequent repairs to fix the hole and the leaking
roof. Badger argues that the invoice was the only evidence as
to the amount of damages caused by his escape and that the
jury had to speculate that the amount of the damages exceeded
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court
considers all the evidence, whether admitted properly or
erroneously. Campbell v. State, 2017 Ark.App. 59,
512 S.W.3d 663. Even if the trial court abused its discretion
in admitting the invoice into evidence, this court would
nevertheless consider it. Although Badger argues that he was
not entirely at fault for the repairs, this argument was
raised as part of his evidentiary objection to the admission
of the invoice, and not part of his directed-verdict motion.
Ingle v. State, 2010 Ark.App. 410, 379 S.W.3d 32
(holding that arguments made in support of
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge that were not made in
directed-verdict motion are not preserved for review). Given
McWilliamss testimony, together with the invoice, we hold
that there was substantial evidence that Badger damaged jail
property in an amount exceeding $1,000. In his argument,
Badger also complains about the "resulting
restitution," but the sentencing order does not reflect
that he was ordered to pay restitution. We also note that the
sentencing order indicates that Badger was convicted of a
Class C felony, which is incorrect. We therefore modify the
order to reflect that Badger was convicted of a Class D
felony under section 5-38-203(b)(2).
Motion to Dismiss for Speedy-Trial Violation
relevant here, Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.1
requires the State to bring a criminal defendant to trial
within twelve months from the date of his or her
arrest, excluding only such periods of
necessary delay as are authorized by Rule 28.3. If a
defendant is not brought to trial within the requisite time,
he or she is entitled to have the charges dismissed with an
absolute bar to prosecution. Ark. R. Crim. P. 30.1(a). Once
it has been shown that a trial will be held after the
speedy-trial period set out in Rule 28.1 has expired, the
State bears the burden of proving that the delay was the
result of the defendants conduct or was otherwise justified.
Miles v. State, 348 Ark. 544, 75 S.W.3d 677 (2002).
This court conducts a de novo review to determine whether
specific periods of time are excludable under the
speedy-trial rules. Federick v. State, 2012 Ark.App.
552, 423 S.W.3d 649.
was arrested on December 8, 2015, and his jury trial occurred
on November 28, 2018— a period of 1,086 days. Thus,
Badger made a prima facie showing that his trial was held
after the speedy-trial period had expired, so the State had
the burden of ...