Sharp v. State

         APPEAL FROM THE HOWARD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 31CR-16-135], HONORABLE CHARLES A. YEARGAN, JUDGE

         McKay Law Firm, PLLC, by: Camille M. Cashion, for appellant.

         Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Jacob H. Jones, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

          OPINION

         WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge

          Appellant Amanda Jill Sharp was convicted in a bench trial of first-degree criminal mischief and criminal trespass. She was sentenced as a habitual offender to fifteen years’ imprisonment, with eight of those years suspended. She was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2,380.77. She argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss. We affirm.

          Appellant was arrested on September 25, 2016, at the home of Deputy John Eric Glidewell of the Howard County Sheriff’s Department. According to the affidavit for the arrest warrant, appellant arrived at Glidewell’s home at approximately 6:00 a.m., at a high rate of speed and parked her vehicle about ten feet from the residence. She jumped out of the vehicle and began screaming and beating on and ramming the front door. She subsequently turned around and began kicking the door. This behavior continued for nearly five minutes even though Glidewell was telling her to stop. Glidewell was able to go outside and place appellant under arrest and call for assistance. As a result of appellant’s actions, there was damage to Glidewell’s front door, including damage to the door frame and glass door. The vinyl siding next to the door also had "holes" in it. The bench warrant was issued October 4.

         At the January 4, 2017 hearing, appellant indicated that she intended to raise mental disease or defect as a defense. Orders for criminal responsibility and fitness to proceed examinations were filed the same day. A forensic evaluation was performed on appellant on February 10, 2017, by Dr. Julia M. Wood. She diagnosed appellant with schizoaffective disorder and methamphetamine-use disorder. Dr. Wood concluded that appellant did not lack the capacity to understand the proceedings against her or to assist effectively in her own defense. However, Dr. Wood opined that appellant lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of her conduct and to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the alleged offense due to her schizoaffective disorder. She also found that appellant "was capable of the culpable mental state required as an element of the alleged offense." She concluded that appellant’s substance abuse was not the "sole cause of her psychotic and mood symptoms." Additionally, she concluded that appellant was not high on drugs at the time of the offense because appellant had used drugs three days prior to the offense and had "slept well since her prior meth use." Dr. Wood’s report was filed on February 15.

          Appellant requested a second mental evaluation at the May 2, 2018 hearing, and orders for criminal responsibility and fitness-to-proceed examinations were filed the same day. Dr. Wood performed another forensic evaluation on appellant on June 21. She made the same diagnosis and findings as before; however, this time the report indicated that appellant’s "substance abuse ended 4 days prior to the alleged crime." The report was filed on June 28.

          At the hearing held on December 5, appellant asked for a bench trial and indicated that she would be raising an affirmative defense based on her mental evaluations. A motion to dismiss based on a lack of criminal responsibility was filed the same day. A hearing on the motion took place on December 12. The court took the matter under advisement. An order denying appellant’s motion was filed on December 21.

          Appellant’s bench trial took place on January 14, 2019. Glidewell testified that he was home asleep on September 25, 2016, when he heard loud music coming up his driveway and gravel popping. According to Glidewell, it "almost sounded like a wreck." He stated that the vehicle pulled up a few feet from his door, beside his bedroom window. He testified that all he could hear was somebody hollering. He stated that he heard a woman’s voice and it sounded like she was beating on his "front metal door with something metal while screaming." He said that he told his wife to call 9-1-1 and subsequently retrieved his gun. He testified that the woman started "kicking the door causing the whole door to shake." He stated that after about five minutes, he realized it was appellant who was yelling his name and trying to get inside his house. He said that he could not understand what appellant was saying because her car radio was "turned up so loud." He testified that although he thought appellant was hitting the door with something metal, he realized that she had "turned around and was kicking it as hard as she could." He threatened to shoot her if she did not move away from his door, which she did not do. He stated that at some point he put his head down near the door and saw sheetrock coming down. He testified that appellant finally sat down in the doorway, and he ran and got his handcuffs. He was able to get her to "scoot back" from the doorway so that he could go outside. Once outside, he placed appellant under arrest. He stated that he asked appellant why she was at his house, and she responded with "random off the wall stuff" such as that "the Baileys had poisoned her and people were getting their electricity." He said that appellant was moving "up and down" and that he finally got her to sit in the yard but that she rolled around, making it "obvious to [him] that she was on drugs." He testified that appellant told him several times that she was on drugs and she later said she was on methamphetamine. He stated that he had known appellant for years, but she had never come to his house. He said that appellant busted his door and damaged his siding with a flashlight that she subsequently put in the flower bed. He stated that he received an estimate in the amount of $2,394 for the damages caused by appellant. He testified that he would end up paying about $4,000 because he is buying a "better door due to this incident."

          On cross-examination, Glidewell stated that he lives two houses down from appellant and that his house is located a half mile from appellant’s home. He said that another deputy lives a couple of miles north of him. He testified that when appellant pulled up, he could hear hollering and that he later could hear her screaming his name. He stated that once he detained appellant, she told him that "the Baileys had poisoned her, someone named Bob, and that she saw something in the ditch." He said that appellant was "looking around, looking off in the ditch, and saying ‘there they are’ insisting somebody was in the ditch." He testified that his door and siding were the only things damaged by appellant.

          On redirect, Glidewell stated that he had worked in law enforcement for nineteen years and had encountered "probably ... hundreds or thousands" of people under the influence of methamphetamine. According to Glidewell, appellant was displaying those same behaviors displayed by people under the influence, such as "seeing things and just looking around and couldn’t stay still." He stated that appellant was "obviously on drugs." He said that if appellant had just been scared, she would have calmed down because he was there, but she just kept talking over him.

         On recross, Glidewell stated that he also had a lot of dealings with people suffering from schizophrenia during his nineteen years in law enforcement. He admitted that he is no doctor but that he believes appellant’s behavior was "drug induced although she might have other issues." He stated that he had spoken with appellant several times before and after the incident and that it was his belief that appellant was on drugs the night in question; however, he admitted schizophrenia can come and go in episodes.

          Appellant made a motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the State’s evidence, challenging the criminal intent and amount of damages. The court ...