APPEAL
FROM THE HOWARD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 31CR-16-135]
HONORABLE CHARLES A. YEARGAN, JUDGE
McKay
Law Firm, PLLC, by: Camille M. Cashion, for appellant.
Leslie
Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Jacob H. Jones, Ass't
Att'y Gen., for appellee.
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
Appellant
Amanda Jill Sharp was convicted in a bench trial of
first-degree criminal mischief and criminal trespass. She was
sentenced as a habitual offender to fifteen years'
imprisonment, with eight of those years suspended. She was
also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2, 380.77.
She argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying
her motion to dismiss. We affirm.
Appellant
was arrested on September 25, 2016, at the home of Deputy
John Eric Glidewell of the Howard County Sheriff's
Department. According to the affidavit for the arrest
warrant, appellant arrived at Glidewell's home at
approximately 6:00 a.m., at a high rate of speed and parked
her vehicle about ten feet from the residence. She jumped out
of the vehicle and began screaming and beating on and ramming
the front door. She subsequently turned around and began
kicking the door. This behavior continued for nearly five
minutes even though Glidewell was telling her to stop.
Glidewell was able to go outside and place appellant under
arrest and call for assistance. As a result of
appellant's actions, there was damage to Glidewell's
front door, including damage to the door frame and glass
door. The vinyl siding next to the door also had
"holes" in it. The bench warrant was issued October
4.
At the
January 4, 2017 hearing, appellant indicated that she
intended to raise mental disease or defect as a defense.
Orders for criminal responsibility and fitness to proceed
examinations were filed the same day. A forensic evaluation
was performed on appellant on February 10, 2017, by Dr. Julia
M. Wood. She diagnosed appellant with schizoaffective
disorder and methamphetamine-use disorder. Dr. Wood concluded
that appellant did not lack the capacity to understand the
proceedings against her or to assist effectively in her own
defense. However, Dr. Wood opined that appellant lacked the
capacity to appreciate the criminality of her conduct and to
conform her conduct to the requirements of the law at the
time of the alleged offense due to her schizoaffective
disorder. She also found that appellant "was capable of
the culpable mental state required as an element of the
alleged offense." She concluded that appellant's
substance abuse was not the "sole cause of her psychotic
and mood symptoms." Additionally, she concluded that
appellant was not high on drugs at the time of the offense
because appellant had used drugs three days prior to the
offense and had "slept well since her prior meth
use." Dr. Wood's report was filed on February 15.
Appellant
requested a second mental evaluation at the May 2, 2018
hearing, and orders for criminal responsibility and
fitness-to-proceed examinations were filed the same day. Dr.
Wood performed another forensic evaluation on appellant on
June 21. She made the same diagnosis and findings as before;
however, this time the report indicated that appellant's
"substance abuse ended 4 days prior to the alleged
crime." The report was filed on June 28.
At the
hearing held on December 5, appellant asked for a bench trial
and indicated that she would be raising an affirmative
defense based on her mental evaluations. A motion to dismiss
based on a lack of criminal responsibility was filed the same
day. A hearing on the motion took place on December 12. The
court took the matter under advisement. An order denying
appellant's motion was filed on December 21.
Appellant's
bench trial took place on January 14, 2019. Glidewell
testified that he was home asleep on September 25, 2016, when
he heard loud music coming up his driveway and gravel
popping. According to Glidewell, it "almost sounded like
a wreck." He stated that the vehicle pulled up a few
feet from his door, beside his bedroom window. He testified
that all he could hear was somebody hollering. He stated that
he heard a woman's voice and it sounded like she was
beating on his "front metal door with something metal
while screaming." He said that he told his wife to call
9-1-1 and subsequently retrieved his gun. He testified that
the woman started "kicking the door causing the whole
door to shake." He stated that after about five minutes,
he realized it was appellant who was yelling his name and
trying to get inside his house. He said that he could not
understand what appellant was saying because her car radio
was "turned up so loud." He testified that although
he thought appellant was hitting the door with something
metal, he realized that she had "turned around and was
kicking it as hard as she could." He threatened to shoot
her if she did not move away from his door, which she did not
do. He stated that at some point he put his head down near
the door and saw sheetrock coming down. He testified that
appellant finally sat down in the doorway, and he ran and got
his handcuffs. He was able to get her to "scoot
back" from the doorway so that he could go outside. Once
outside, he placed appellant under arrest. He stated that he
asked appellant why she was at his house, and she responded
with "random off the wall stuff" such as that
"the Baileys had poisoned her and people were getting
their electricity." He said that appellant was moving
"up and down" and that he finally got her to sit in
the yard but that she rolled around, making it "obvious
to [him] that she was on drugs." He testified that
appellant told him several times that she was on drugs and
she later said she was on methamphetamine. He stated that he
had known appellant for years, but she had never come to his
house. He said that appellant busted his door and damaged his
siding with a flashlight that she subsequently put in the
flower bed. He stated that he received an estimate in the
amount of $2, 394 for the damages caused by appellant. He
testified that he would end up paying about $4, 000 because
he is buying a "better door due to this incident."
On
cross-examination, Glidewell stated that he lives two houses
down from appellant and that his house is located a half mile
from appellant's home. He said that another deputy lives
a couple of miles north of him. He testified that when
appellant pulled up, he could hear hollering and that he
later could hear her screaming his name. He stated that once
he detained appellant, she told him that "the Baileys
had poisoned her, someone named Bob, and that she saw
something in the ditch." He said that appellant was
"looking around, looking off in the ditch, and saying
'there they are' insisting somebody was in the
ditch." He testified that his door and siding were the
only things damaged by appellant.
On
redirect, Glidewell stated that he had worked in law
enforcement for nineteen years and had encountered
"probably . . . hundreds or thousands" of people
under the influence of methamphetamine. According to
Glidewell, appellant was displaying those same behaviors
displayed by people under the influence, such as "seeing
things and just looking around and couldn't stay
still." He stated that appellant was "obviously on
drugs." He said that if appellant had just been scared,
she would have calmed down because he was there, but she just
kept talking over him.
On
recross, Glidewell stated that he also had a lot of dealings
with people suffering from schizophrenia during his nineteen
years in law enforcement. He admitted that he is no doctor
but that he believes appellant's behavior was "drug
induced although she might have other issues." He stated
that he had spoken with appellant several times before and
after the incident and that it was his belief that appellant
was on drugs the night in question; however, he admitted
schizophrenia can come and go in episodes.
Appellant
made a motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the State's
evidence, challenging the criminal intent and amount of
damages. The court denied the motion and appellant put on her
defense.
Dr.
Wood testified that she is employed by the Division of
Behavioral Health Services in Little Rock through the State
of Arkansas and that she conducts psychological evaluations
for the court. She stated that she has practiced for fifteen
years and performs approximately 150 evaluations a year. She
testified that of that number, she has found only about ten
people incapable of being held responsible for their crimes.
She stated that she first came in contact with appellant in
February 2017 when she performed a forensic evaluation on
appellant. She said that the test consisted of a clinical
interview, a mental-status exam, and a concrete test called
the Georgia Court Competency Test. She stated that she also
performed the Mississippi State Hospital Revision because it
"gets more volitional information than the original
test." She stated that appellant scored a ninety out of
one hundred, which indicated that she understood the legal
matters and charges against her and that she was capable of
assisting her attorney in preparing for trial. She said that
she ultimately found appellant fit to stand trial. She also
testified that she evaluated appellant twice to determine if
appellant was capable of conforming her actions to appreciate
the criminality of her conduct. She stated that during the
June 2018 examination, she performed a clinical interview to
get appellant's history of mental illness, drug usage,
and behavioral disorder. She testified that this information
was "relevant . . . to rule certain things out"
before a patient is evaluated for mental illness. She stated
that she looked at the police report and also obtained
appellant's version of events. She testified that
appellant has an extended history of mental illness. She said
that it was her opinion that on the date in question,
appellant was "experiencing a psychotic state and
hallucinating due to untreated schizophrenia, not
drugs." She testified that she did not base her opinion
on appellant's word alone, but that she looked at
appellant's past medical records that included events of
hallucinations and delusions at times when appellant was not
using drugs. She stated that appellant claimed she had not
used drugs for an extended period of time, but appellant was
still experiencing delusions similar to those experienced at
the time of the crime. She said she had to take
appellant's word that appellant was not using drugs
because the State did not require drug screens. Additionally,
she stated that appellant did not exhibit the signs of drug
usage or withdrawal at the time of the evaluations. She
further testified that in her fifteen years, she has
"evaluated patients on meth. If [she] believe[s] they
are actively intoxicated[, ][she] give[s] them a choice of
admitting it or not[, ] but [she] immediately stop[s] the
exam. [She] cannot examine what your mental status is if
you're intoxicated because many drugs mimic the symptoms
of mental illness and it confuses the picture." Dr. Wood
testified that appellant could not appreciate the criminality
of her conduct or conform her conduct within the bounds of
the law at the time in question. She also stated that
appellant acted appropriately under her mistaken belief that
someone was chasing her.
On
cross-examination, Dr. Wood stated that she reviewed the
probable-cause affidavit because that was all she received
from the State. She said that she met with appellant for an
hour and a half during the examinations and that appellant
claimed no drug use the three days prior to the incident and
claimed to have slept since last using. She testified that it
was important to know that when someone uses meth, "once
you can sleep, that's the crash. If you're able to
sleep, the meth has worn off." She reiterated that she
did not perform a drug test on appellant. She also stated
that no drug test was performed subsequent to appellant's
arrest, and there was no reference to drug use in the
affidavit. She testified that the only evidence she had of
whether appellant was under the influence of drugs at the
time of the crime was appellant's version of events. She
stated that appellant did not exhibit the signs of a meth
user when she evaluated appellant. She said that during her
evaluation of appellant, she saw active symptoms of
delusions, and it was her opinion that appellant was not
intoxicated at that time. Therefore, she concluded that
appellant's delusions were not solely caused by drug use.
She also said that appellant was not actively intoxicated at
the time of the incident. However, she stated that if
appellant had admitted to Glidewell she was on meth at the
time of the incident, "that would influence [her]
opinion."
On
redirect, Dr. Wood stated that whether appellant used meth
three or four days before the incident would not "have
influenced [her] opinion as to whether [appellant] was under
the influence of ...