United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Texarkana Division
O. Hickey Chief United States District Judge.
1, 2019, Plaintiff Thomas Waylon Boyd filed this case in the
Eastern District of Arkansas, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. The Eastern District transferred the case to the
Western District of Arkansas, Texarkana Division, on July 9,
2019. Following several rounds of the Court directing
Plaintiff to file amended complaints and Plaintiff filing
noncompliant pleadings, Plaintiff filed a second amended
complaint on September 11, 2019. On October 16, 2019, the
Court entered a screening order that dismissed all of
Plaintiff's claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
(ECF No. 15). Consequently, this case was closed.
October 30, 2019, Plaintiff filed what was docketed as a
motion to reopen this case. (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff's
motion is a confusing jumble of arguments in which he appears
to: (1) ask for this case to be reopened; (2) quote at length
from the Bill of Rights; (3) cite to various amendments to
the Arkansas Constitution; and (4) argue that the Court
improperly applied law that prevented him from pursuing his
claims instead of accepting his allegations as true.
Plaintiff's motion is meritless, but the Court will
attempt to briefly address each of his points.
first asks the Court to reopen this case. He cites no
authority in support of this request and does not elaborate on
the propriety of the request. The Court sees no basis upon
which to reopen the case and finds that Plaintiff has not
shown good cause to open the case. Even if the Court were to
construe the request as a motion for reconsideration under
either Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b),
Plaintiff has failed to offer any reason justifying relief
from the Court's October 16, 2019 screening order.
See Innovative Home Health Care, Inc. v. P.T.-O.T.
Assocs. of the Black Hills, 141 F.3d 1284, 1286 (8th
Cir. 1998) (“Rule 59(e) motions serve the limited
function of correcting manifest errors of law or fact or to
present newly discovered evidence.”); MIF Realty
L.P. v. Rochester Assocs., 92 F.3d 752, 755 (8th Cir.
1996) (stating a party may obtain Rule 60(b) relief from a
final judgment for, among other reasons, mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect).
also quotes passages from the Bill of Rights and cites to
various amendments to the Arkansas Constitution. The
relevance of these sections is unclear to the Court and
Plaintiff does not explain or apply these authorities to the
case at hand. Consequently, the Court finds that these
citations are insufficient to obtain the requested relief.
Plaintiff argues that the Court erroneously relied on caselaw
that hindered his ability to pursue his claims and should
have instead taken the allegations in his second amended
complaint as true. Plaintiff misunderstands the Court's
October 16, 2019 screening order. The Court did take
Plaintiff's allegations as true for purposes of the
screening order. However, even when assuming that the
allegations were true, Plaintiff's claims nonetheless
failed because they: (1) were asserted against people who
were immune from suit; (2) failed to state a viable claim
upon which relief could be granted; (3) lacked specific
detail as repeatedly ordered by the Court; (4) concerned
domestic-relations matters that the Court chose to abstain
from hearing; or (5) were barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 447 (1994). Plaintiff has offered no
reason to cause the Court to believe that these issues were
adjudicated incorrectly. Thus, the Court finds this argument
the Court finds no basis upon which to grant the relief
requested in the instant motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff's
motion (ECF No. 16) is hereby DENIED.
IS SO ORDERED.
 The Court will not recount this
process in detail because it was set out in the Court's
October 16, 2019 screening order. (ECF No. 15, pp.
 The beginning of the instant motion
cites 34 U.S.C. § 12361, which provides a civil cause of
action for victims of gender-motivated crimes of violence. In
the absence of any explanation from Plaintiff, the Court
finds that this statute has no application to this case
because Plaintiff's ...