United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Jonesboro Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff
Marla Morrisett has appealed the final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA)
denying her claim for disability insurance benefits (DIB),
based on disability.[1] Both parties have submitted appeal briefs,
and the case is now ready for decision.[2] The only issue
before the Court is whether the Commissioner's decision
is supported by substantial evidence. After reviewing the
administrative record and the argument of the parties, the
Court finds the Commissioner's decision is supported by
substantial evidence.
I.
Background
Mrs.
Morrisett protectively filed for DIB on May 20, 2016,
alleging a disability onset date of April 1, 2015. (Tr. 11,
131, 242) She claims disability due to: plantar fasciitis,
degeneration of intervertebral disc of cervical region,
chronic pain, arthritis, neck pain, sacroiliac joint
dysfunction, muscle spasms, headaches, low back pain,
shortness of breath, solitary thyroid nodule right lower,
abnormal chest, right thyroid, bilateral low back pain,
non-morbid obesity, degeneration of lumbar, acid reflux
disease, narrowing of spinal canal, left hip pain, and
chronic pain of left knee. (Tr. 133, 293) Plaintiff's
claim was denied at the initial and reconsideration levels. A
hearing was held on February 22, 2018, before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).[3] The ALJ issued an unfavorable
decision, denying Plaintiff's claim on April 18, 2018.
(Tr. 8-23) The Appeals Council subsequently denied the
request for review. (Tr. 1-3) It is from this decision that
Plaintiff now brings her appeal.
II.
Administrative Proceedings
Plaintiff
was forty-three (43) years old at the time of the
administrative hearing and had past relevant work as a
material handler. (Tr. 106-7) The ALJ applied the five-step
sequential evaluation process[4] to Plaintiff's claim.
Plaintiff satisfied the first step because she had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged
onset date April 1, 2015. At step two, the ALJ found
Plaintiff had the following medically determinable
impairments[5]: cervical and lumbar degenerative disc
disease, osteoarthritis of the left hip and knee, peripheral
neuropathy, heel spurs, plantar fasciitis, and obesity, but
at step three, he found none of these impairments met or
equaled a listing. (Tr. 13-14) Before proceeding to step
four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the residual
functional capacity[6] (RFC) to perform unskilled, sedentary
work, [7] with restrictions: (1) lift and carry 10
pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently; (2)
stand and/or walk two hours in an eight-hour workday; (3) sit
six hours in an eight-hour workday; (4) push and/or pull 10
pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently; (5)
use an assistive device when walking and/or standing; (6)
reach frequently overhead with the right arm and occasionally
with the left; and (7) sit/stand option that involves
standing or walking in intervals of 10 minutes and sitting in
intervals of 30 minutes. (Tr. 14)
The ALJ
found Plaintiff unable to perform any past relevant work.
(Tr. 22) Relying on the testimony of a vocational expert
(VE), the ALJ found other work existing in the national
economy that Plaintiff could perform, such as document
preparer and call out operator. (Tr. 23) Accordingly, the ALJ
found Petitioner was not disabled. (Id.)
III.
Plaintiff's Allegations
Plaintiff
claims the ALJ's decision that she is not disabled
because she can perform other work in the economy is not
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
(Plaintiff's Brief, Doc. No. 14, p. 17) Specifically,
Plaintiff contends the ALJ (1) improperly discredited the
opinion of Clarence Kemp, M.D., her treating physician, and
(2) failed to consider her limited daily activities and long
work record when assessing her credibility. (Id. at
17-30)
IV.
Discussion
A.
Standard of Review
The
Court's function on review is to determine whether the
Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial
evidence. Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th
Cir. 2000); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial
evidence” in this context is less than a preponderance
but more than a scintilla. Slusser v. Astrue, 557
F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir. 2009). In other words, it is
“enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate
to support the ALJ's decision.” Id.
(citation omitted) The Court does not “reweigh the
evidence presented to the ALJ, ” Baldwin v.
Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing
Bates v. Chater, 54 F.3d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1995)),
or “review the factual record de novo.”
Roe v. Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1996)
(citing Naber v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 186, 188 (8th Cir.
1994)). Instead, if, after reviewing the evidence, the Court
finds it “possible to draw two inconsistent positions
from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
Commissioner's findings, [the Court] must affirm the
[Commissioner's] denial of benefits.” Kluesner
v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 2008)).
This is true even in cases where the Court “might have
weighed the evidence differently.” Culbertson v.
Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir.
1992)). The Court may not reverse the Commissioner's
decision “merely because substantial evidence exists
for the opposite decision. Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d
185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Johnson v. Chater,
87 F.3d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 1996)); see Goff v.
Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2005)(“[A]n
administrative decision is not subject to reversal simply
because some evidence may support the opposite
conclusion.”).
B.
Arguments on Appeal
Plaintiff
contends the Commissioner's decision that she is not
disabled is not supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole. (Plaintiff's Brief, Doc. No. 14, pp.
15-17) Specifically, Plaintiff avers the ALJ reached his
decision she could perform a wide range of sedentary work by
discounting the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Kemp,
and instead relying on the opinions of state agency doctors
who did not actually examine her but just reviewed some of
her medical records. She also argues the ALJ failed to
consider her limited daily activities and long work record
when assessing her credibility. (Id. at pp. 17-30)
1.
RFC and Dr. ...