APPEAL
FROM THE CRAWFORD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 17CR-17-1253]
HONORABLE MICHAEL MEDLOCK, JUDGE
Dusti
Standridge, for appellant.
Leslie
Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway,
Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, JUDGE
Christopher
Hooten was convicted by a Crawford County jury of aggravated
assault, first-degree criminal mischief, resisting arrest,
and fleeing (both on foot and by vehicle) and was sentenced
as a habitual offender.[1] Hooten appeals only his
criminal-mischief and resisting-arrest convictions, claiming
that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a
directed verdict on those charges. We affirm.
On
appeal, a motion for directed verdict is treated as a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Robinson v.
State, 2017 Ark.App. 689, 537 S.W.3d 765. When the
sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and
consider only the evidence supporting it under our standard
of review. Groomes v. State, 2019 Ark.App. 408,
__S.W.3d __. We will affirm if the finding of guilt is
supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial
evidence is evidence of such sufficient force and character
that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion
one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or
conjecture. Id. With this standard in mind, we turn
to review the evidence presented to the jury.
On
November 22, 2017, Hooten was involved in a high-speed chase
on Interstate 40. State Trooper Ben Ibarra initially clocked
Hooten's vehicle traveling 87 miles per hour. Trooper
Ibarra activated his blue lights and attempted a traffic
stop. Hooten refused to pull over, and a chase ensued. During
the chase, Hooten's speed fluctuated between 80 and 130
miles per hour. Trooper John Bass joined the pursuit. Because
Hooten refused to stop, troopers then deployed spike strips
along the interstate to deflate the tires on Hooten's
vehicle. After hitting the spike strips, Hooten continued to
travel over 90 miles per hour on the vehicle's rims. When
the deployment of spike strips did not work, Trooper Bass
attempted to drive in front of Hooten to box him in, hoping
to force him to slow down and come to a stop. Instead of
slowing down or stopping, Hooten attempted to pass Trooper
Bass. When he was unable to do so, he rammed Trooper
Bass's car multiple times. Eventually, the troopers
decided to perform a PIT[2] maneuver to end the pursuit. Trooper
Bass executed the maneuver, which caused Hooten's vehicle
to stop in the median ditch.
With
his vehicle immobilized, Hooten exited the vehicle and fled
on foot across the eastbound traffic. Trooper Ibarra followed
with his gun drawn. When Hooten reached a tree line across
the interstate, he encountered a fence. He stopped and turned
to face Trooper Ibarra. Trooper Ibarra holstered his weapon
and attempted to restrain him. Hooten refused to comply, and
a struggle ensued. During the scuffle, Trooper Ibarra and
Hooten fell to the ground. The scuffle continued on the
ground, making it difficult for Trooper Ibarra to place
Hooten in handcuffs. At some point during the struggle with
Hooten, Trooper Ibarra's microphone clip broke off his
belt. Hooten was eventually subdued and placed under arrest.
Later,
Trooper Bass had the damage to the passenger door of his
vehicle repaired with the costs exceeding $2, 000. Based on
this evidence, the jury convicted Hooten of aggravated
assault, first-degree criminal mischief, resisting arrest,
and fleeing (both on foot and by vehicle).
On
appeal, Hooten challenges only his convictions for criminal
mischief and resisting arrest, contending that the State
failed to present sufficient evidence to support either
conviction.[3] A person commits criminal mischief in the
first degree if he or she "purposely and without legal
justification destroys or causes damage to any property of
another." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-38-203(a)(1) (Repl.
2013). This offense is a Class D felony if the amount of
actual damage is more than $1, 000 but less than $5, 000.
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-38-203(b)(2). A person commits the
offense of resisting arrest if he knowingly resists a person
known by him to be a law enforcement officer effecting an
arrest. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2016).
As to
his criminal-mischief conviction, Hooten argues that the
State failed to sufficiently prove the amount of damages to
the vehicle or that he acted purposely in causing the damage.
More specifically, he claims that Trooper Bass did not
testify to the actual dollar amount of the cost for repairs
made to the damaged vehicle, and because no other evidence of
the cost of repairs was introduced, there was insufficient
evidence to support the conviction of criminal mischief.
Admittedly, Trooper Bass did not testify to an actual dollar
amount of the repair costs. He did, however, testify that he
took the car to be repaired and that it cost over $2, 000 to
repair the vehicle. Trooper Bass's testimony alone as to
the cost of repairs was sufficient to support the verdict.
See White v. State, 2012 Ark.App. 302; Andrews
v. State, 2012 Ark.App. 597, 424 S.W.3d 349. Therefore,
his argument fails in this respect.
He also
argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence
that he purposely caused damage to the patrol car driven by
Trooper Bass. He claims he was not purposely trying to cause
damage to the vehicle; he was simply attempting to flee the
traffic stop. We are not persuaded.
Clearly,
Hooten engaged in a high-speed chase with speeds in excess of
90 miles an hour. When officers attempted to slow him down,
he rammed his vehicle into Trooper Bass's car, not once,
but three separate times. By statutory provision, a person
acts purposely with respect to his or her conduct or a result
of his or her conduct when it is the person's conscious
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause the
result. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 2013).
Further, we have held that it is axiomatic that one is
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of
his or her actions and that a criminal defendant's intent
or state of mind will usually be inferred from the
circumstances of the crime, since it is seldom capable of
proof by direct evidence. Stearns v. State, 2017
Ark.App. 472, 529 S.W.3d 654. Since Hooten did not stop until
his vehicle was disabled, and he continued to flee on foot
afterward, the jury could properly infer that Hooten acted
purposely when he hit and damaged Trooper Bass's vehicle
in his attempt to evade the authorities.
Next,
Hooten argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict
him of resisting arrest. Specifically, he argues that the
State failed to prove he used or threatened to use physical
force or any other means that created a substantial risk of
physical injury to any person. Ark. Code Ann. §
5-54-103(a)(2) (Repl. 2016). He notes that physical injury is
defined as the impairment of physical condition, the
infliction of substantial pain, or the infliction of
bruising, swelling, or a visible mark associated with
physical trauma. Ark. Code Ann. § ...