APPEAL
FROM THE JOHNSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 36DR-16-184],
HONORABLE GORDON W. "MACK" MCCAIN, JR., JUDGE
Iris
L. Muke, Inc., by: Iris L. Muke, for appellant.
Veach
Law Firm, P.A., by: Robert M. Veach, Russellville, for
appellee.
OPINION
ROBERT
J. GLADWIN, Judge
Appellant Eric Carr appeals the divorce decree entered by the
Johnson County Circuit Court in favor of appellee Maranda
Carr on her counterclaim for divorce on the basis of general
indignities. Eric argues that the circuit court erred in
unequally allocating the marital liabilities, in awarding
rehabilitative alimony to Maranda, and in failing to consider
the relevant factors in awarding her permanent alimony. We
affirm.
I.
Facts
The
parties were married on September 2, 2000, and separated on
August 15, 2016. Eric filed for divorce on September 1, and
on September 7, Maranda filed her answer and counterclaim.
Considering the length of the parties marriage, the parties
financial circumstances, and other factors, Maranda requested
both temporary and permanent spousal support from Eric.
Prior
to the hearing on January 24, 2018, counsel for the parties
announced that the parties had reached an agreement on all
issues except alimony, attorneys fees, and court costs. The
parties property-settlement agreement was read into the
record with no objection, and counsel stipulated that the
property had been equally divided between the parties. Erics
counsel advised the circuit court that it would not need to
look at the values of the property when making its decision
on alimony because everything was settled. The parties
agreement was filed on February 6.
During
the hearing, the circuit court heard testimony from Doris
Davis, a certified public accountant, who testified as an
expert for Maranda. Ms. Davis testified that she was familiar
with the parties respective earnings during the marriage,
the tax consequences concerning an award of alimony, the
parties respective spendable incomes, and Erics ability to
pay alimony. Maranda testified as to her need for alimony,
the standard of living to which she had become accustomed
during the parties sixteen-year marriage, and other factors
regarding her request for alimony. Eric testified that since
2011, his income was at least twice that of Marandas, and in
certain years, three times more.
The
circuit court found that the property-settlement agreement
was equal despite Erics objections at the hearing that the
division of liabilities was unequal. The circuit court
ordered Eric to pay Maranda permanent alimony of $265.35 a
week based on Erics making $885 a week and Marandas making
$354.61 a week. The amount was to give both parties an equal
amount of $619.96 each week. Alimony was to be paid
retroactively from the date of separation until Maranda
remarries, lives with someone tantamount to marriage, or
dies.
Temporary rehabilitative alimony was awarded to Maranda for
three years, to be calculated at the end of the year by
taking Erics net bonuses and subtracting Marandas net
bonuses and splitting the difference on a fifty-fifty basis.
After the three-year period, the split of the bonus
difference will constitute permanent alimony, but at a
reduced amount— 23.49 percent— the same
percentage as the difference between weekly incomes of each
party. It is to terminate upon the same conditions as
permanent alimony.
The
divorce decree was filed April 19, and Eric filed a timely
notice of appeal on May 21.[1] On May 31, he also filed
a notice of appeal from the May 2 deemed-denied ruling on his
motion to reconsider the divorce decree that was filed on
April 1.[2]
II.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Arkansas appellate courts review divorce cases de novo on the
record. Moore v. Moore,2019 Ark. 216, at 6, 576
S.W.3d 15, 20. The circuit courts findings pertaining to the
division of property will not be reversed unless they are
clearly erroneous or against the preponderance of the
evidence. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when
the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Id. at 7, 576 S.W.3d at 20. We also give due
deference to the circuit courts determination of the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to
their testimony. Id. This ...