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PRO SE
APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO.
18CR-09-44], HONORABLE JOHN N. FOGLEMAN, JUDGE
Ernest
Brown, pro se appellant.
Leslie
Rutledge, Atty Gen., by: Brad Newman, Asst Atty Gen., for
appellee.
OPINION
Rhonda
K. Wood, Associate justice
Ernest
Brown appeals the circuit courts denial of his pro se
petition for writ of error coram nobis. Brown contends that
the writ should issue and the judgment be vacated because his
defense counsel coerced him into pleading guilty. Because
Brown has failed to demonstrate that the circuit court abused
its discretion, we affirm.
In
2009, Brown entered a plea of guilty to aggravated robbery
and was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment. Imposition of
an additional 120 months imprisonment was suspended. In
2018, Brown filed his petition for a writ of error coram
nobis. He alleged that his counsel did not advise him
correctly on the percentage of his sentence that he would be
required to serve before becoming parole eligible or the
effect that his prior convictions would have on his parole
eligibility.
We
review a circuit courts decision on a petition for writ of
error coram nobis for abuse of discretion. Newman v.
State, 2014 Ark. 7, 2014 WL 197789. An abuse of
discretion occurs when the court acts arbitrarily or
groundlessly. Nelson v. State, 2014 Ark. 91, 431
S.W.3d 852. A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily
rare remedy. State v. Larimore, 341 Ark. 397, 17
S.W.3d 87 (2000). The function of the writ is to secure
relief from a judgment when there existed some fact that
would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to
the trial court and that, through no negligence or fault of
the defendant, was not brought forward prior to the judgment.
Newman v. State, 2009 Ark. 539, 354 S.W.3d 61. The
writ is allowed only under compelling circumstances to
achieve justice and to address errors of the most fundamental
nature. Dednam v. State, 2019 Ark. 8, 564 S.W.3d
259. A writ of error coram nobis is available to address
certain errors that are found in one of four categories.
Howard v. State, 2012 Ark. 177, 403 S.W.3d 38. Error
coram nobis proceedings are attended by a "strong
presumption" that the judgment of conviction is valid.
Nelson, 2014 Ark. 91, at 3, 431 S.W.3d at 854.
Brown
argues he was coerced into pleading guilty, and therefore,
the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the writ.
His arguments for issuance of the writ were that (1) his
attorney induced him to plead guilty by letting him believe
he would be parole eligible sooner; (2) counsel did not
inform him of the full effect of his prior convictions; and
(3) counsel was inadequate by withholding the knowledge of
the effect of his prior convictions on his parole-eligibility
status.
To
prevail on a claim of writ of error coram nobis on the ground
that a plea was coerced, the petitioner bears the burden of
establishing that the plea was the result of fear, duress, or
threats of mob violence. Hall v. State, 2018 Ark.
319, 558 S.W.3d 867.
The
allegation that a guilty plea was coerced in the sense that
it was involuntarily and unknowingly given as a result of
erroneous advice does not constitute a showing of a coerced
plea within the scope of a coram nobis proceeding.
Griffin v. State, 2018 Ark. 10, 535 S.W.3d 261;
see also Green v. State, 2016 Ark. 386, 502
S.W.3d 524 (Erroneous advice regarding parole-eligibility
status did not support a claim of a coerced plea and thus did
not provide a basis for coram nobis relief.). We have held
that a petitioners allegation that he or she was induced to
plead guilty by virtue of improvident advice from counsel
constitutes an allegation of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Griffin, 2018 Ark. 10, 535 S.W.3d 261. An
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is not
cognizable in a coram nobis proceeding. White v.
State, 2015 Ark. 151, 460 S.W.3d 285.
Browns arguments that counsel did not fully explain his
parole eligibility or the effect of his prior convictions do
not rise to the level of coercion sufficient to meet his
burden of establishing grounds for the writ. Any
assistance-of-counsel argument that Brown wanted to make in
the plea proceeding should have been raised pursuant to
Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2007).
White, 2015 Ark. 151, 460 S.W.3d 285; see
also State v. Tejeda-Acosta, 2013 Ark. 217, 427
S.W.3d 673 (The claim that the petitioners plea of guilty
was induced in the sense that it was involuntarily and
unknowingly given as a result of erroneous advice from his
counsel was a ground for relief under the Rule, not a ground
for a writ of error coram nobis.). Error coram nobis
proceedings are not a substitute for proceeding under Rule
37.1 to challenge the validity of a guilty plea, nor are the
two proceedings interchangeable. Nelson, 2014 Ark.
91, 431 S.W.3d 852
Because we find the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion ...