United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Central Division
RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
The
following Recommended Disposition
(“Recommendation”) has been sent to United States
District Judge Lee P. Rudofsky. You may file written
objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do
so, you must specifically explain the factual and/or legal
basis for each of your objections, and your objections must
be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14)
days of the date this Recommendation was filed. By not
objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of
fact.
I.
Introduction:
Plaintiff,
Cassandra Denise Blanchard (“Blanchard”), applied
for disability benefits on February 9, 2016, alleging
disability beginning on October 18, 2015.[2] (Tr. at 11).
After conducting a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) denied her application for benefits. (Tr.
at 24). Because the Appeals Council later denied her request
for review (Tr. at 1), the ALJ's opinion now stands as
the final decision of the Commissioner.
For the
reasons stated below, this Court should reverse the
Commissioner's decision and remand the case for further
proceedings.
II.
The Commissioner's Decision:
The ALJ
found that Blanchard had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since the original onset date of October
18, 2015. (Tr. at 14). At Step Two, the ALJ found that
Blanchard had the following severe impairments: postural
orthostatic tachycardia syndromes (“POTS”),
pseudo seizures, neurologic cardiac syncope, depression, and
anxiety. Id.
After
finding that Blanchard's impairments did not meet or
equal a listed impairment (Tr. at 14-17), the ALJ determined
that she had the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform less than
sedentary work, with additional limitations,
[3]
which included only occasionally climb stairs, balance,
stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; she could not climb ladders,
work around hazards (unprotected heights and moving
mechanical parts), or work in extreme heat; she could perform
simple, routine, and repetitive tasks; she could make simple
work related decisions; she could concentrate, persist, and
maintain pace with normal breaks; and she must have only
incidental interpersonal contact with supervision which is
simple, direct, and concrete. (Tr. at 17).
Based
on this RFC, the ALJ concluded that Blanchard was unable to
perform any of her past relevant work. (Tr. at 23). At Step
Five, the ALJ relied upon the testimony of a Vocational
Expert (“VE”) to find that, based on
Blanchard's age, education, work experience and RFC, she
could perform other jobs, such as food & beverage clerk
and stuffer (one who fills pillows and toys). (Tr. at 24,
58). Accordingly, the ALJ held that Blanchard was not
disabled. Id.
III.
Discussion:
A.
Standard of Review
The
Court's function on review is to determine whether the
Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole and whether it is based on
legal error. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477
(8th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
While “substantial evidence” is that which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, “substantial evidence on the record as a
whole” requires a court to engage in a more
scrutinizing analysis:
“[O]ur review is more than an examination of the record
for the existence of substantial evidence in support of the
Commissioner's decision; we also take into account
whatever in the record fairly detracts from that
decision.” Reversal is not warranted, however,
“merely because substantial evidence would have
supported an opposite decision.”
Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2005)
(citations omitted).
It is
not the task of this Court to review the evidence and make an
independent decision. Neither is it to reverse the decision
of the ALJ because there is evidence in the record which
contradicts his findings. The test is whether there is
substantial evidence in the ...