United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Texarkana Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION
HON.
BARRY A. BRYANT U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff,
Virginia Clayton, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), seeking judicial review of a decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Commissioner)
denying her claim for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) benefits under Title
II of the Social Security Act (hereinafter “the
Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A). In this judicial review, the court must
determine whether there is substantial evidence in the
administrative record to support the Commissioner's
decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The
Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate
judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case,
including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final
judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF
No. 4. Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this
memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment
in this matter.
1.
Background:
Plaintiff
protectively filed her application on March 10, 2016. (Tr.
66)[2]
. In her application, Plaintiff alleged being disabled due
to: fibromyalgia, chronic migraines, cluster headaches,
depression, stomach/IBS, hypothyroidism, dermatitis, TMJ,
extreme dry eye with floaters, chronic sinus problems, acid
reflux, vertigo, and an accessory bone in her right foot with
an alleged onset date of June 2, 2014. (Tr. 66, 284).
Plaintiff's application was denied initially and again
upon reconsideration. (Tr. 66). Plaintiff requested an
administrative hearing and that administrative hearing was
held on October 30, 2017. (Tr. 115-135). At this hearing,
Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel, Gregory
Giles. (Id.). Plaintiff and a Vocational
Expert (“VE”) testified at the hearing.
(Id.).
Following
the administrative hearing, on September 5, 2018, the ALJ
entered an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 62-70). The ALJ found
Plaintiff had last met the insured status requirements of the
Act through March 31, 2018. (Tr. 68, Finding 1). The ALJ also
found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity from her alleged onset date of June 2, 2014, through
her date last insured. (Tr. 68, Finding 2). The ALJ
determined Plaintiff had the severe impairments of:
fibromyalgia; plantar fasciitis of the right foot, lumbar
spine degenerative disc disease; and migraines. (Tr. 68-70,
Finding 3). Despite being severe, the ALJ determined that,
prior to the established onset date, those impairments did
not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the
Listings of Impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 (“Listings”). (Tr. 70, Finding 4).
The ALJ
considered Plaintiff's subjective complaints and
determined her RFC. (Tr. 70-74). The ALJ evaluated
Plaintiff's subjective complaints and found her claimed
limitations were not entirely consistent with the medical
evidence and other evidence in the record. (Tr. 71). The ALJ
determined Plaintiff retained the RFC to:
[P]erform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except
can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; can occasionally
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can occasionally balance,
stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (Tr. 70).
The ALJ
then evaluated Plaintiff's Past Relevant Work
(“PRW”) and determined that, through her date
last insured, Plaintiff could perform her PRW as a high
school teacher as actually and generally performed. (Tr.
74-76, Finding 6). The ALJ found that, alternatively, there
were jobs in the significant numbers in the national economy
that Plaintiff could perform. Id.. With the help of
the VE, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform the
representative occupations of price tutor with approximately
244, 960 jobs in the nation, or school instruction with
approximately 7, 130 jobs in the nation. Id. Based
upon this finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was not
disabled at any time from June 2, 2014, the alleged onset
date, through March 31, 2018, the date last insured. (Tr. 76,
Finding 7).
Thereafter,
Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council's review of the
ALJ's decision. (Tr. 239-41). On January 29, 2019, the
Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's disability
determination. (Tr. 7-10). On March 4, 2019, Plaintiff filed
the present appeal. ECF No. 1. Both Parties have filed appeal
briefs. ECF Nos. 11, 13. This case is now ready for decision.
2.
Applicable Law:
It is
well-established that a claimant for Social Security
disability benefits has the burden of proving his or her
disability by establishing a physical or mental disability
that lasted at least one year and that prevents him or her
from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See
Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act
defines a “physical or mental impairment” as
“an impairment that results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§
423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his or her
disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for
at least twelve consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A).
To
determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a
disability, the Commissioner uses the familiar five-step
sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the
claimant is presently engaged in a “substantial gainful
activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe
impairment that significantly limits the claimant's
physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities;
(3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or
equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the
regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard
to age, education, and work experience); (4) whether the
claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to
perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the
claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the
national economy that the claimant can perform. See
Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers the
plaintiff's age, education, and work experience in light
of his or her RFC if the final stage of this analysis is
reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,
416.920 (2003).
3.
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