United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Texarkana Division
JAMES STUART and CAREDA L. HOOD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated PLAINTIFFS
v.
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY DEFENDANT
ORDER
Susan
O. Hickey Chief United States District Judge
Before
the Court is Plaintiffs James Stuart and Careda L. Hood's
Agreed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement. (ECF No. 245). Plaintiffs, on behalf of
themselves and as Representative Plaintiffs on behalf of a
proposed Settlement Class, and Defendant State Farm Fire and
Casualty Company, all acting by and through their respective
counsel, have agreed, subject to Court approval, to settle
this litigation upon the terms and conditions stated in the
Stipulation of Settlement filed with the Court (the
“Stipulation”). (ECF No. 245-1). On December 16,
2019, the Court held a hearing on the motion. The Court finds
the matter ripe for consideration.
Pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), the Court must
approve this class action settlement before it becomes
effective. Review of a proposed class action settlement
typically proceeds in two stages. “At the first stage,
the parties submit the proposed settlement to the Court,
which must make ‘a preliminary fairness
evaluation.'” Martin v. Cargill, Inc., 295
F.R.D. 380, 383 (D. Minn. 2013) (quoting Fed. Judicial Ctr.,
Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth
(“MCL”), § 21.632). “If the proposed
settlement is preliminarily acceptable, the Court then
directs that notice be provided to absent class members, in
order to afford them an opportunity to be heard on, object
to, and opt out of the settlement.” Id.
(citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(3), (e)(1), (e)(5)).
When
making a preliminary fairness evaluation, the “fair,
reasonable, and adequate” standard imposed by Rule
23(e)(2) is lowered, and the Court's focus is on whether
the settlement is “within the range of possible
approval due to an absence of any glaring substantive or
procedural deficiencies.” Schoenbaum v. E.I. Dupont
De Nemours and Co., No. 4:05-cv-1108-ERW, 2009 WL
4782082, at *3 (E.D. Mo. 2009). Although proposed settlements
are presumptively reasonable at the preliminary-approval
stage, the Court must nonetheless “consider issues such
as whether the settlement carries the hallmarks of collusive
negotiation or uninformed decision-making, is unduly
favorable to class representatives or certain class members,
or excessively compensates attorneys.” Id.
“Because there is typically no client with the
motivation, knowledge, and resources to protect its own
interests, the judge must adopt the role of a skeptical
client and critically examine the class certification
elements, the proposed settlement terms, and procedures for
implementation.” MCL at § 21.61.
Rule
23(e), as amended, does not change this fundamental inquiry,
as the crux of the Court's preliminary approval
evaluation is whether “giving notice [to the class] is
justified by the parties' showing that the court will
likely be able to: (i) approve the proposal under Rule
23(e)(2); and (ii) certify the class for purposes of judgment
on the proposal.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e)(1)(B). The
Court's inquiry remains focused on “the primary
procedural considerations and substantive qualities that
should always matter to the decision whether to approve the
proposal.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e)(2) advisory
committee's note to 2018 amendment.
IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The
Stipulation is incorporated by reference in this Order and
all terms defined in the Stipulation will have the same
meanings in this Order.
2. The
Stipulation and Proposed Settlement are preliminarily
approved as fair, adequate, and reasonable, and
Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of the
Proposed Settlement is hereby GRANTED in all
material respects, subject to further consideration at the
Final Approval Hearing.
3.
Contingent upon final approval of the Proposed Settlement,
and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
Plaintiffs' motion for to conditionally certify the
litigation Class previously certified herein for settlement
purposes is hereby GRANTED. The following
Settlement Class is conditionally certified for settlement
purposes only:
All persons and entities that received “actual cash
value” payments, directly or indirectly, from State
Farm for loss or damage to a dwelling or other structure
located in the State of Arkansas, such payments arising from
events that occurred between May 1, 2010 and December 6,
2013, where the cost of labor was depreciated.
Excluded
from the Class are:
(1) all persons and entities that received payment from State
Farm in the full amount of insurance shown on the
declarations page;
(2) State Farm and its affiliates, officers, and directors;
(3) members of the judiciary and their staff to whom this
action is assigned; and (4) Class Counsel.
4. James Stuart and Careda L. Hood are preliminarily
appointed as representatives of the settlement Class (the
“Representative Plaintiffs”), and the Court
preliminarily finds that the following attorneys for
Plaintiffs satisfy the adequacy requirement of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23, and appoints such counsel as counsel
for the Settlement Class (“Class Counsel”):
D. Matt Keil John C. Goodson Keil & Goodson P.A. 406
Walnut St. Texarkana, AR 71854
A.F. “Tom” Thompson, III Kenneth P.
“Casey” Castleberry Murphy, Thompson, Arnold,
Skinner & Castleberry P.O. Box 2595 1141 E. Main St.,
Suite 300 Batesville, AR 72503
R. Martin Weber, Jr. Richard E. Norman Crowley Norman LLP
Three Riverway, Suite 1775 Houston, TX 77056
Steven E. Vowell Taylor Law Partners 303 E. Millsap Rd. P.O.
Box 8310 Fayetteville, AR 72703
Matthew L. Mustokoff Richard A. Russo, Jr.Kessler Topaz
Meltzer Check LLP 280 King of Prussia ...