Levi Wilson, Individually; M W, by and through his next friend Levi Wilson Plaintiffs - Appellees
Scott Lamp, in his individual and official capacity; Iowa, State of Defendants - Appellants Jessica Dorhout-VanEngen, in her individual and official capacity; John Doe, in his individual and official capacity Defendants Levi Wilson, Individually; M W, by and through his next friend Levi Wilson Plaintiffs - Appellees
Scott Lamp, in his individual and official capacity; Iowa, State of Defendants Jessica Dorhout-VanEngen, in her individual and official capacity Defendant-Appellant John Doe, in his individual and official capacity Defendant
Submitted: October 19, 2017
Appeals from United States District Court for the Northern
District of Iowa - Sioux City
GRUENDER and BENTON, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM  , District
BENTON, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
Wilson and his minor son, M.W., sued two officers for
unreasonable search and seizure, and use of excessive force
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied the
officers' motions for summary judgment. Having
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court reverses
in part, affirms in part, and remands.
parties dispute the following facts, which are stated here
favorably to the plaintiffs. On September 23, 2014, officers
Scott E. Lamp and Jessica Dorhout-VanEngen were surveilling a
park. Based on conversations with Hollie
ex-girlfriend, and the mother of M.W. and a minor girl-the
officers believed a convicted child molester, David C.
Wilson, was meeting the minor girl at 8:00 p.m. at the park.
David had multiple outstanding warrants. The officers knew
that David's brother, Levi, and seven-year-old M.W. were
at a Boy Scout meeting and would leave the park around 8:00
p.m. to meet Vlietstra. At about 7:10 p.m., the officers
received a call that someone had just driven away without
paying for gas. An attendant identified David as the driver
of the vehicle, quickly determined to be Levi's. At 7:50
p.m., a pickup truck with a covered bed-which had been parked
during the officers' surveillance-left the park. The
officers knew it also belonged to Levi. After following the
truck for a few minutes, they stopped it. They approached
with guns drawn. They told the driver to put his hands up. He
complied. Officer Dorhout-VanEngen recognized Levi and called
him by name. The officers ordered him out of the truck. He
complied. Officer Lamp grabbed Levi and threw him against the
truck, with a gun pointed at the back of his head. The
officers did a patdown of Levi. They searched the vehicle and
left. Throughout the stop, Levi and M.W. had at least one
weapon pointed at them. Levi and M.W. now both suffer from
and receive treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder.
officers sought summary judgment, asserting qualified
immunity. The district court denied qualified immunity. The
and M.W. argue that this court lacks jurisdiction. They agree
that this court may review the denial of qualified immunity
if the issue "is a purely legal one: whether the facts
alleged . . . support a claim of violation of clearly
established law." See Pace v. City of Des
Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1052 (8th Cir. 2000), quoting
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 n.9 (1985).
However, Levi and M.W. believe that because the issues on
appeal are based in fact, this court lacks jurisdiction.
See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995). To
the contrary, the officers' arguments address the legal
determinations of the district court based on the facts
viewed favorably to Levi and M.W. This court has
court "review[s] the district court's grant of
summary judgment de novo, viewing the record in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor."
Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir.
2011). The denial of qualified immunity is reviewed de novo.
Boude v. City of Raymore, 855 F.3d 930, 933 (8th
Cir. 2017). Government actors have qualified immunity as a
shield against litigation if their actions do not
"violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To
defeat qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden to
prove: "(1) the facts, viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a
constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was
clearly established at the time of the deprivation."
Howard v. Kansas City Police Dep't, 570 ...